THREAD: #Russia- #Turkey interaction over #NagornoKarabakh getting uneasy. After #Moscow turned down #Ankara’s proposal to set up #Syria-type format for Karabakh ( #KarabakhAstana) @MevlutCavusoglu told #Lavrov cease-fire not gonna happen until #Armenia leaves occupied Azeri areas

Earlier, I forecasted that #Turkey's ultimate goal in this war was not to fight anyone but get a new deal with #Russia. It was obvious from @RTErdogan's criticism of Minsk OSCE group performance on #Karabakh. Bu the devil is in details & here they are https://twitter.com/m_suchkov/status/1310911822833373184

1. #Turkey's position - to support #Azerbaijan - meant to disguise its interest - to extend its influence in #Caucasus.
Turkey hopscotching crises - #Greece/ #Cyprus, #Libya, #Syria now Karabakh to increase its capitalization in the market of regional powers w/ great power ambitions

2. To promote its interest, #Turkey seeks to reach 3 goals
A. To change status-quo in #NagornoKarabakh conflict in favor of #Azerbaijan
B. To ensure a role of a new mediator for itself
Ankara said it was raedy to support #Baku "both in the fight or at the negotiating table”

3. #Turkey seems to care little that this new role is not acceptable for #Armenia. Eventually, #Assad also not happy that Turkey sits on “Astana group”, #Haftar openly sabotages third-party agreements w/ #Erdogan. What matters is the new status is recognized & emraced by #Russia.

This3d goal:
C. Create mechanism of interaction b/n #Russia & #Turkey over #NagornoKarabakh which will be another link in the chain of #Putin- #Erdogan deals in RUS southern security flank.
Over last few years the deals been mutually beneficial but also fraught w/ complications

4. Despite all the difficulties b/n the two in #Syria & #Libya, it's crystallized that #Turkey sees #Russia as a resource for creating its strategic autonomy, while RUS needs TUR as a tool of increasing its own authority as a great power

5. The problem w/ a deal over #Karabakh is that for now #Russia lacks a set of constructive incentives to work w/ #Turkey over the issue.
TUR's deal w/ RUS over SYR was a rather "forced", tactical move...

Being under #Russia/n sanctions over the downed jet, w/ loyal opposition groups severely softened by #Russia, SAA & #Iran & with little support from the West, @RTErdogan figured that bandwagoning w/ #Moscow (& #Tehran) will leave #Ankara w/ at least something in #Syria

6. #Erdogan got a lot more, but it also worked for #Russia/n interest at that time: #Turkey was pulled away from the coalition of the willing to topple #Assad & could serve as a confidant for opposition groups in their own contacts w/ Moscow.RUS made itself a lesser evil than Iran

7. In #Karabakh none of the conditions in place. #Russia thinks it has enough leverage on both parties, Minsk OSCE, as imperfect as it is helps advance RUS interest in preserving status quo (which favors #Armenia more than #Azerbaijan).

In fact, given current divergences b/n #Turkey & #France, #Russia/n interest woul be better served via Minsk OSCE than via a deal w/ #Erdogan. (Note: Putin, @EmmanuelMacron conversation today despite the #Navalny case)