After months of increasing tensions leaders will discuss relations with Turkey at a special European Council meeting today and tomorrow. In this piece for @LSEEuroppblog I discuss the outlook for the EU-Turkey relationship. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/10/01/the-eus-turkey-challenge/ A thread:

1) Ankara has clashed with Greece and Cyprus, disputing their maritime boundaries and sending ships to explore for hydrocarbons and assert its own extensive maritime claims. Advancing these claims is also a way for Turkey's gvt. to deflect attention from the country’s economy.

2) Turkey and Greece came close to a military clash in September, but tensions eased after Turkey paused exploration and toned down rhetoric. Bilateral talks between Athens and Ankara have restarted. However, Turkey has maintained the pressure on Cyprus.

3) Member states have condemned Ankara's unilateral actions and imposed mild sanctions. They want Turkey to resolve its differences with Greece peacefully, and to refrain from aggressive actions towards Cyprus. They also want to foster a less dysfunctional EU-Turkey relationship

4) But they disagree on how to achieve this. CY, GR and FR believe TR is an aggressive power and that only being firm can push it to halt unilateral actions. For CY and GR, it is frustrating that many other member states seem to be more concerned about Belarus than the EastMed

5) This led CY to veto EU sanctions on Belarusian individuals involved in election fraud and the ensuing crackdown. CY said it did not oppose sanctions per se, but that it wanted the EU to also impose additional sanctions on Turkey for its activities in its waters

6) But Turkey’s recent moves to reduce tensions with Greece mean there is little appetite amongst other member states for new sanctions. Most think that sanctions on Turkey would only push it to lash out and sabotage recently started dialogue between Athens and Ankara.

7) For most member states Turkey is an important NATO ally. Europeans are unlikely to agree on the best way to approach Turkey while they disagree on whether Ankara’s willingness to pause unilateral actions towards Greece and engage in talks represents a genuine de-escalation

8) But even if Ankara resumes energy exploration, additional sanctions are likely to be limited. These are unlikely to push Turkey to lash out in the way member states fear, but also won’t do much to discourage it from more unilateral actions.

9) Member states are unlikely to agree on tougher sanctions that might push Ankara to rethink its priorities unless Turkey substantially escalates its provocations, as such sanctions would also carry a much larger risk of increasing tensions.

10) Disillusioned with the EU's stance on Turkey, it is likely that Greece and Cyprus will redouble their efforts to bolster their defence ties to France and the US, as they have already been doing.

11) Meanwhile, a common EU policy will necessarily be limited to trying to use diplomacy to steer relations with Ankara in a more constructive direction. The starting point could be reviving migration co-operation.

12) The EU should offer to extend its existing programme to help Turkey support the 3.6 million refugees it is hosting if Ankara pauses all its energy exploration activities.

13) A new deal is in the EU’s interests: Europe would be betraying its values if it relied only on Greece forcefully repelling migrants at the border. And Turkey would welcome the EU’s help, as supporting the refugees is a large burden.

14) The money should not go to the Turkish government but would be used to directly support refugees. Funding would be disbursed in tranches and would be halted if Ankara resumed unilateral activities.

15) Ultimately improvement in EU-TR relations depends on whether Ankara thinks it gains more from confrontation or improving relations. Together with Turkey’s economic difficulties, a new agreement to cooperate on migration could help persuade Erdoğan of the merits of the latter