“The problem is not simply the overuse of [SOF], but also the misuse of different special operations elements. The ‘all hands on deck’ approach...has created an environment in which various [SOF] are used for the wrong purposes.” From @StephenTankel https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/making-the-u-s-militarys-counter-terrorism-mission-sustainable/

This is an astute point from @StephenTankel, and the best example is the essentially interchangeable use of Green Beret, SEAL, and MARSOC teams in Iraq/Afg/Africa/Yemen for theater SOF training and advisory missions over the past decade as though they were all the same.

I think there’s a flip side to this, though: if combat advisory missions are essentially all that a SOF unit has been called upon to perform for 15 years, and the SOF unit isn’t well-suited for it...shouldn’t that SOF unit evolve and *become* well-suited for it? A thread on that: https://twitter.com/wesleysmorgan/status/1298308093567217669

That’s not a decision that SEAL teams or SF battalions get to make, of course—it would be on SOCOM, parent services, etc. But I always think about what Abrams about paratroopers in Vietnam in ref to GWOT-era mismatch between some SOF units’ training/culture and their missions. https://twitter.com/wesleysmorgan/status/1298391838278201345