[Thread] Last month in Oval Office, Trump asked Iraqi PM Kadhimi: “What do we get out of this [relationship]?” This was asked repeatedly, pointing to how much the US gives, but what does it receive in return? The PM’s response – centering on regional stability – didn’t resonate.

Some suggest Kadhimi can salvage the US presence in Iraq and take military action against the Iranian-backed militias. But such advice is misplaced and represents an act of desperation, entailing the highest form of risk for the PM – not to mention the civil unrest unleashed.

For many years, the US has faced a commitment problem in Iraq. How can it credibly signal the strength and reliability of its commitment while it also diminishes and narrows its commitment – and now threatens to leave the country?

There was recognition within the PM’s inner circle, especially after last month’s DC visit, that the US lacks an appreciation of the PM's political constraints to confront militias, per my article with @LahibHigel in @ForeignPolicy  https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/25/in-iraq-the-united-states-must-be-careful-what-it-wishes-for/

For weeks, frustration and fears mounted and the word “Benghazi” began to emerge inside US bureaucracy to characterize current anxieties. Pompeo’s pressure on Kadhimi cascades from Trump’s pressure on Pompeo: if you can’t shut down the threat your way, I’ll shut it my way.

Between now and election, the US presence represents a political vulnerability for Trump. A window of opportunity exists for Iran and its proxies to have maximum political effect to (a) coercively force exit, and/or (b) embarrass Trump on world stage à la the Iran hostage crisis.

Things might even get worse for Kadhimi. Should the PM move against the Iranian-backed militias as desired by senior US policymakers, it might counterproductively prompt even more militia retaliation against the US embassy and its personnel.

This would pressure the US to possibly escalate with direct military involvement – a potential and chaotic mess with terrible optics for Trump’s campaign, which also undercuts a safe and orderly withdrawal from Iraq, even in the rare event the PM is eventually successful.

For now, gauging credibility of US threat to close embassy can’t be distinguished from a real threat or a bluff. The threat is situated within a temporal gray zone: could reflect both intentions, simultaneously. No permanent decision, yet, and one is not necessarily permanent.

The warning reflects Trump’s overall desire to exit Iraq (and Syria) and mitigate risk of a Benghazi-like scenario from undercutting his electoral interests, and also reflects Pompeo’s desire to utilize threat and add pressure on Iraqi govt to crackdown on Iran-backed militias.

But exiting Iraq upsets the balance of vulnerability (in favor of the US), which has helped dampen the prospect of military escalation leading to war. That pacifying effect kicked in last January, as Iran credibly demonstrated capability and intention to retaliate on US targets.

But without American targets in close proximity and reach, Tehran’s retaliatory capability is narrowed and less coercive in manipulating the costs for Washington. The hope of maintaining some deterrence against future and unilateral American aggression is weakened.

An American-less Iraq ushers in a more unstable balance between the US and Iran. There is a possibility that Trump (in the wake of an electoral loss) might aim to put a final nail in the coffin of any hopes of the Iran nuclear accord being resurrected under a Biden presidency.