New Armenian-Azerbaijani violence: some reflections at the end of day 1 (thread). Any reflections at this stage are inevitably provisional in a highly fluid context, no hindsight here and could be wrong (constructive correction welcomed). 1/9

Relevant comparison is April 2016, although appears to be larger-scale: an intentional but limited aims operation aimed at recovering territories + consolidating more advantageous new ceasefire, packaged as a military win. Political, as well as military, motivations are key. 2/9

So far reports suggest 16 Armenian killed in action, 100+ injured; Azerbaijani KIA unknown. Reports of at least 7 civilian deaths (5 Az, 2 Arm) across divide + more injured. Reports of extensive military hardware destroyed + civilian infrastructure damaged. 3/9

Impossible to verify reported Azerbaijani territorial gains today – but worth remembering that recaptured villages can be deserted settlements in 'no man’s lands' since 1990s, and territorial control can change very quickly (remember Talysh in April 2016). 4/9

Operation probably seeks redress for July 2020 + to establish new status quo before pandemic-related hard times ahead + to act on offers of Turkish support. Also channels deep Azerbaijani frustration, long-standing but especially visible in July, with ineffective diplomacy. 5/9

Turkish support for Azerbaijan not new but increasingly explicit. Seems to involve force short of actual war, or where there might be plausible deniability? Use of drone tech, intelligence sharing, and unconfirmed reports of mobilization of Syrian mercenaries. 6/9

Russian security guarantees inactive in Karabakh, but would be forced to act if large-scale war reaches Armenia. Russia’s best outcome is rapid ceasefire affirming Moscow’s influence, but restraining any Armenian plans for counterattack would be litmus test of that influence. 7/9

Like Russia, other international actors – Iran, France, EU, Council of Europe – quick to call for restraint; US appears behind the curve + disengaged, with grave implications for the ARM-AZ peace process, founded in the mid-1990s in a context of ‘unipolar multilateralism’ 8/9.

Escalatory potential? If both sides can walk away with a narrative of success, could be another 4/5-day war. If not, then the motivation to prolong conflict and 'turn the tide' may keep hostilities going, with greater likelihood of external involvement. 9/9