THREAD ON TALIBAN'S RECENT 'CLARIFICATION' INTERVIES ON INTRA-AFGHAN TALKS.

TB has recently released two interviews (one in Farsi with Salam Hanafi and other in Pashto with Khairullah Khairkhwa in next tweet).

This thread looks at what was said in both. https://twitter.com/IeaOffice/status/1310114933636558848

Both interviews virtually mirror each other and were intended to refute some of the media speculation around the disputes on 'framework'. There are however some differences in tone and content.

Quick note
KK = Khairkhwa
SH = Salam Hanafi https://twitter.com/IeaOffice/status/1309898772865077260?s=20

The main reason for the interviews are to admonish govt for leaking details of sticking points & for 'distortions' during these leaks.

So in a sense it is intended for public relations purposes. Not sure if it achieves that goal or generates more questions....

They state that both sides had agreed that info would be kept secret until an agreement had been reached & then jointly shared with media. Accuses govt side of breaching this and leaking info. Also accuses them of 'distorting' facts (presumably for public opinion).

TB is correct in the sense that during US-TB negotiations, points of contentions were better guarded compared to now. But the prevention of leaks in these negotiations might be much more difficult given that TB are negotiating with multiple actors (at their own insistence).

Both KK & SH state that most points have been resolved except for two.

ISSUE ONE: Reference to US-TB deal
According to them, intra-AFG are based on TB-US deal and hence that agreement should be referenced in framework. AFG apparently initially objected to this.

They eventually agreed but on the condition that the agreement also refer to Loya Jirga agreement or the corresponding US-Afghanistan Joint Declaration.

TB give several reasons for rejecting this demand. One was that 'they didn't ascent to either' & they don't recognise them.

On the Joint Declaration, KK gives other reasons too.
1. TB was not party to Declaration and it is unrelated to them.
2. It hasn't got the same (legal) status as the US-TB Agreement.
3. Also that TB was not privy to the Declaration while AFG govt was privy as Zal shared details.

SH states a further reason:
4. States the Doha agreement was 'an agreement on behalf of all of us'.

I really don't follow any of these reasons. If Declaration was unrelated to TB but so was Doha deal. And no, AFG govt as not privy to Doha deal, they only got snippets & crumbs.

As for legal status, there is actually more legal certainty in the Joint Declaration then in the Doha deal. The Declaration is subject to international but the Doha deal isn't.

Point 4 is beyond the pale.

While, some commentators have given the Joint Declaration different interpretations, I think that Declaration is of central importance if the US is to withdraw according to the Doha deal without incurring state liability under the US-AFG Bilateral Agreement.

Although I intend to do a thread on that at some point, short version is, it would actually be in the TB's benefit to reference that Declaration.

So far, TB is actually refusing to even move onto other items in framework unless govt side drops demand for Declaration.

ISSUE TWO: Hanafi fiqh as legal school for resolving disputes.

KK states many different jurisprudence schools and to create certainty we asked Hanafi fiqh as the arbitrator in resolving issues. It has been used in AFG for centuries and acceptable to majority.

This issues was disputed by govt side who stated that it should be caveated with reference to Jafari fiqh for the country's minority Shias. TB refusing this and stating that we are not creating constitution & such an inclusion would be more appropriate in constitutional document.

At that stage, KK states, we can incorporate references to Jafari fiqh and protections for minorities including non-Muslims.

SH frames the issue in a way that had me very confused.

He stated that the provision stipulated that in 'interpretation of Nusoos' (texts) we wanted the Hanafi fiqh to be the determining school of thought. Nusus is jurisprudential terminology that is generally applied to all legal texts.

If Nusus here meant interpretation of the envisioned future agreement between the two sides and related documents than this would be a minor issue has there is very little difference of opinion on jurisprudential interpretation principles between the schools.

But if Nusus is referring to all religious issues then it includes a very expansive scope and arguably extends far beyond the scope of intra-Afghan framework. In that case, apprehension by the 'Shia' delegates & their insistence for caveat is understandable.

SH adds that during the Emirate era, the 'personal issues' of Shias were protected.

What does that mean? Were Shias during that time allowed to practice Jafari fiqh in their personal law sphere?

Anyone has any info on this?

KK's tone is much harsher stating that refusing to yield to TB's demands in these two issues & leaks show bad faith by govt legation.

Also states the govt side hasn't got authority and seems to be hindered by actors in AFG.

Lastly SH is asked about women rights & his answer is troubling.

States women's rights will be protected. During the Emirate era, women were protected, women worked in private clinics, in government hospitals, female police officers were employed for searching female suspects.

'However back then we were engaged in war (meaning they couldn't do more?) and women should not be concerned.'

This indicates TB still sees the Emirate era restrictions as the norm and might not be willing to accommodate as much as is hoped. Or could be a force of habit, presenting all Emirate era policies as 'kingdom of heaven' ideals to which all Afghans aspire. END