Thread by @bricksilk, Here are my thoughts on the super-sensitive CHIS (Criminal Conduct) Bill #CHISBill, [...]

Here are my thoughts on the super-sensitive CHIS (Criminal Conduct) Bill #CHISBill, published today in time (just) for 2nd reading in @HouseofCommons on Monday https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/920714/CHIS_Factsheet.pdf. /1

CHIS = covert human intelligence source https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/26: put simply, an agent who for whatever reason (personal, financial, even patriotic) agrees to help the police, MI5 or others spy on suspected criminals. They are authorised under #RIPA https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/29 /2

CHIS play a vital role in disrupting terrorism and organised crime. Over the past year, CHIS operations by @metpoliceuk alone are claimed to have led to 3500 arrests, recovery of 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, seizure of 400 kg of Class A drugs, and £2.5m cash. /3

But what happens if a CHIS (e.g. to maintain cover) takes part in the criminality they are supposed to be informing on - by helping a banned terror group, handling stolen goods, supplying drugs - or worse? /4

Under the so-called "James Bond clause", MI6 agents can be authorised to break UK law abroad: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/section/7. But police/spooks pre-authorising people to break UK law in the UK? That sounds different. /5

Last December, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal was divided on the issue of whether MI5 had an implied statutory power to authorise CHIS participation in criminality https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Privacy-Internnational-Ors-IPT-17-86-87-CH.pdf /5

The stakes were high - just look how the judgment started. Especially as the power is claimed not just by MI5 (as in that case) but by @HMRCgovuk, @NCA_UK, several other public authorities and every police force in the land. /6

The Government won 3-2, but the case is being appealed and no one could be confident of the result. So the Government has decided to seek Parliament's express authority, in the form of #CHISBill. /7

They are right to do so. Police and security forces must always have a democratic licence to operate. It's (to coin a phrase) A Question of Trust …https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Print-Version.pdf. /8

But Parliament also has a duty to scrutinise this Bill. Here are a few questions that colleagues in @HouseofCommons and then @UKHouseofLords will want to ask. /9

First, are we happy that all these bodies need not only to be able to run CHIS, but to authorise criminality by them? /10

Secondly, are we content that the processes for authorising CHIS to commit crime are sufficiently sound - in every one of these bodies, not just the biggest? The bottom line is self-authorisation with internal safeguards: lots of detail here. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/920537/CHIS_Code_-_Bill_amendments.pdf. /11

Thirdly, should the Act at least specify types of serious crime that can never be authorised? The Canadian CSIS Act s20(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-23/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-23.html does (how's it working, @cforcese?) Or would hard limits allow gangs to smoke out CHIS by inviting them to step over the line? /12

Fourthly, how does all this square with human rights? The Government has set the ball rolling here: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0188/CHIS%20(CC)%20Bill%20-%20ECHR%20Memo%20FINAL.pdf. /13

Finally, it's great that @IPCOffice will be keeping an eye on the use of these powers - after the event. /14

But should they be entrusted either with prior approval of authorisations (as for some other forms of covert surveillance, such as phone-tapping) https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/23/enacted ... /15

... or at least be notified of authorisations in real-time, so that they can raise the alarm if someone is way out of line? /16

To recap - the principle of this Bill deserves our strong support. But the detail matters, and we need to apply ourselves to it. /17 end

Correction: it’s s20(18) of the Canadian CSIS Act