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Some ideas on how to get out of the highly damaging fight between EU26-EC-EP and #Cyprus over the #Belarus and #Turkey sanctions. Thread. 1/
First some background on each side’s public and, in the EU’s case not so public, positions. Health warning: many will be offended but it is important that each side gets where the other is coming from. 2/
The (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus position: Turkey invaded us in 1974. OK it was after a Greek coup. But Turkey’s right of intervention only extended to restoring the constitutional set-up. 3/
The invasion caused mass dislocation and loss of property. Turkey is still here, 46 years later, on what you recognise as EU territory. It was your choice to let us in divided. 4/
Now Turkey is drilling in our EEZ and continental shelf (infringement of sovereign rights) and at one point in our territorial waters (incursion into more of our sovereign territory). 5/
We are an EU member state and we don’t understand why you seem to care less about the violation of a member state’s sovereignty and sovereign rights than you do about non-EU citizens in Belarus. 6/
We also couldn’t fail to notice that you jumped to help #Greece when Turkey was exploring in its maritime waters but you are not trying so hard when it comes to us. Why the double standards? 7/
We also think that recent behaviour by Turkey amply demonstrates that giving it what it wants – we call it appeasement – just encourages more bad behaviour. You will regret it if you sit back and do nothing. 8/
The EU narrative (not all of this is public): Sh*t. If we impose sanctions on Turkey we are scared of another migration wave, of what it means for our exporters, of what it means for our banks (especially Spain). Sh*t we should never have let a divided Cyprus into the EU. 9/
Turkey wouldn’t be in your EEZ if you hadn’t said no to the Annan Plan in 2004 and if you hadn’t wrecked* Crans Montana talks in 2017. We were there, remember. 10/
*I am aware there are two completely different narratives about this: Turkey’s fault v Greek Cypriots’ fault. I am just relating what I have heard many many times. 11/
Also all those little things you keep doing on the ground: like trying to block EU ambassadors from celebrating the restoration with EU € of cultural heritage in the north, holding up funding for bicommunal spaces, blocking cooperation between academics, those history books! 12/
Like gold plating the Green Line regulation. The way you rushed to close crossing points in February when there were no cases but kept the airports open and the carnivals running. 13/
We don’t accept your sovereignty arguments about intercommunal cooperation. We think it shows you just never want a solution of the Cyprus problem and are hiding behind Turkey. 14/
Oh and we have never forgotten how you made a guy president after he bust UN sanctions to help arm Milosevic who was committing crimes against humanity. 15/
And we really don’t like how the entire Greek Cypriot establishment got rich on Russian money. We think the high-level political connections to this money make it different in scale from our own, multibillion euro moneylaundering in our own banks + various other scandals. 16/
The Turkish Cypriot position: Hi remember us? We are EU citizens too. We voted Yes in 2004 and all the polls since show we would do so again. Why is the new Commission pointedly ignoring us? 17/
So now the EU26 and EU institutions and Cyprus are fuming. It is deeply damaging not just for Cyprus BUT FOR THE EU AS WELL, not least because some heavy European influencers are behaving rather badly. How do we get out of this? 18/
Let’s start with the ultimate goal: peace and stability within the EU and on the EU’s borders. How do we get there? We address everyone’s interests. 19/
EU interest: for Turkey to be a cooperative partner not a daily headache on land and maritime borders. To sanction Lukashenko. 20/
Cyprus’ interest: short term: Turkey out of its EEZ. Long-term: Turkey out of its life. I am convinced this applies to Turkish Cypriots as much as Greek Cypriots. 21/
Turkey’s interest: to be a recognised player in East Med energy. Not to feel “surrounded” by the recent EG-IL-GR-CY-US love-in. 22/
How do we get there?
1. Agreement on Greece-Turkey maritime borders.
2. Agreement on Cyprus-Turkey maritime borders.
3. Turkey enters the multi-country East Med Gas Forum.
4. A new “gas-plus” pax Mediterranea. See my ideas here.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/gas-plus-deal-east-med-fiona-mullen?articleId=6699670568058290176#comments-6699670568058290176&trk=public_profile_article_view
23/
1. Agreement on Greece-Turkey maritime borders.
2. Agreement on Cyprus-Turkey maritime borders.
3. Turkey enters the multi-country East Med Gas Forum.
4. A new “gas-plus” pax Mediterranea. See my ideas here.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/gas-plus-deal-east-med-fiona-mullen?articleId=6699670568058290176#comments-6699670568058290176&trk=public_profile_article_view
23/
It is important to understand that the EU’s problems with Turkey and/or Cyprus will not go away until numbers 2 (CY-TR maritime borders) and 3 (TR somehow “in the East Med game”) are achieved. 24/
Achieving 1 (GR-TR maritime borders) is possible with bilateral talks. Achieving 3 (TR as a legitimate player eg via the East Med Gas Forum) is dependent on 2 (CY-TR delimitation). 25/
So the EU faces a choice:
a) Work on CY-TR independently of the #Cyprob. That won't even start for all kinds of thread-length reasons relating to the Cyprob.
b) Put the EU's weight behind a solution of the Cyprob, which fixes 2 and paves the way for 3 and 4 above.
26/
a) Work on CY-TR independently of the #Cyprob. That won't even start for all kinds of thread-length reasons relating to the Cyprob.
b) Put the EU's weight behind a solution of the Cyprob, which fixes 2 and paves the way for 3 and 4 above.
26/
How does the EU put its weight behind a Cyprob solution? Sticks and carrots. Commit to Turkey sanctions if GCs convince you that they are laying the groundwork for a solution at home. What would that entail? 27/
It means unblocking a bunch of areas of G/Cypriot-T/Cypriot intercommunal cooperation, starting with #COVID19 and crossing points. EC/UN/MFAs will have a long wishlist. On that note you need continuous, senior-level contact with the UN in Cyprus if you don’t have it already. 28/
What next? Starting #Cyprob talks normally leads to better behaviour on all sides. So EU could do half a job and then leave it to the poor old UN to go round and round in circles with the sides. Result: EU faces another crisis in a year or so. 29/
Better option: recognising that the solution of the #Cyprob is difficult, requires clambering over ENORMOUS psychological barriers for all concerned, throw enough money and other carrots for the solution of the Cyprob to be something to LOOK FORWARD TO, not something to fear. 30/
Carrots are a critical requirement for Greek Cypriot assent. It isn’t a hopeless case. Polls here suggest the GCs can get there. But the political elites need a lot of handholdIng to take the plunge. So EU elites need to commit to seeing this through. 31/
http://ucy.ac.cy/dir/documents/dir/cpsaltis/Options_for_Solution_to_the_Cyprus_issue_2020_ENG.pdf
http://ucy.ac.cy/dir/documents/dir/cpsaltis/Options_for_Solution_to_the_Cyprus_issue_2020_ENG.pdf
What carrots might work? Some ideas from me here. To repeat: this a serious crisis for the EU, not just Cyprus. But if the EU gets this right, it's a great opportunity to show off its "geopolitical" credentials. There is no need to muck it up. Ends. 32/32 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ii-ideas-winning-cyprob-referendum-fiona-mullen
