The focus in some orgs on ‘advanced’ digital security is a serious tactical error. It leads to an inefficient system coupled with a false sense of security.

The focus often becomes an appearance of security instead of really interrogating the impact of the approach

Many ‘secure’ platforms are clunky or require tech some don’t have access to. They also are often not secure at a high level, and even if they are truly end to end secure, the end is a person, which is the age-old method of intel-gathering

What sometimes ends up happening is the false sense of security leads to people saying things that should not be said, or spreading information further than it should be. I’ve seen some evidence that some of these platforms are intended as traps in that way

The best security approach is assuming your group could be infiltrated and under surveillance, and calmly acting accordingly. Groups should be keeping things on need to know basis, working in as small groups as possible on high risk projects.

The most important part to remember is that a communist’s best defense is winning community support. Take care to not needlessly endanger yourselves, but don’t let that prevent work from occurring.

Another important piece of analysis- different levels of state actors work at different abilities of intel-gathering. Local PDs could potentially get your texts but they’re not gonna use those in court unless it’s big, it wouldn’t be worth exposing otherwise

Fusion centers and other programs are impacting this some as higher level programs share intel on local activists at a greater rate, but there’s still some distinction

Another comrade brought up an important point- people always want to leave the phones in another room or something. Often the best intel they get from phones is location, if it’s that sensitive of a meeting don’t bring your phone at all