Threading some thoughts on Brigade Support Areas and how they integrate into the BCT fight.

Let me preface this by telling y'all I'm just a lowly junior officer, so if you're looking for expert opinions, keep it moving

These are just the things I've seen and experienced

So, BSAs. The lifeblood of the BCT sustainment network.
We're taught that the BSA needs to be close enough to the FLOT to provide uninterrupted sustainment to the maneuver fight, but far enough behind that it isn't vulnerable to catastrophic losses from enemy shenanigans.

That placement is an inexact science at best and routinely features shortcomings that result in maneuver units and their FSCs running into trouble along the trains concept. Shenanigans.
I think the shortcomings can be broken down into three main categories:

Movement, establishment, security.

Moving the BSA in tandem with an ABCT fight is a sprint. The lines of communication and support get stretched paper thin.
Establishment of the BSA (most importantly the Role 2 Clinic) is a deliberate process that the maneuver BNs can't wait on,

But uninterrupted support requires us to be deliberate with it. Doctrinally the Role 2 is required to establish in 90 minutes from jump. But if we're maneuvering tens of kilometers a day that gets...dicey.

Decisive operations without a Role 2 established puts the maneuver battalions at the mercy of their Role 1 clinic's capabilities, and when those capabilities are exceeded, people die. Unnecessarily.
90 minutes is the goal but it doesn't take outliers into account:

Convoy shenanigans, maintenance issues, enemy activity along the route, pushing the BSA into contested area, etc.
That 90 minutes can turn into 4 hours quick fast and in a hurry.
Putting a pin in that for now.
Maintenance capabilities & establishment!
Similarly to the Role 2,

If we're pushing the BSA every day or every other day, the likelihood that the BFMC will be able to establish deliberate maintenance support ops is...marginal.
Every BSB I've ever been in or worked with has made their BFMC the main effort for BSA security and defense, to free up

The BN staff to manage the BSA, the Charlie Med to est the Role 2, the ADC to push LOGPACs to the CTCPs. It happens. The BFMC gets the brunt of the BSA taxes. Perimeter obstacles, fighting positions, EA dev, etc. Not a ton of maintenance happening.

That's probably marginally okay when we're talking an exercise that is less than a week. But a typical CTC rotation will see maneuver BNs pulling maintenance issues of the volume and type that will exceed their FMTs' & FSCs' capabilities.

That's when "passback" maintenance will not only be necessary but absolutely critical. But if the BFMC can't drop a FRS or ARSS or expand the DSESTS because we know we're pushing the BSA tomorrow, or we don't have the bodies to do it because they're all in security or recovery...

The BSA isn't truly flexing all its capabilities, and the maneuever BNs will feel that most.
That moves me to my next point: security.
The BSB isn't MTOEd security platforms. We're last in priority of fires. Last in CAS. Last in essentially every brigade capability that we

Could leverage to secure and defend the BSA. We're the only BN not MTOEd a Chemo. We MAY have 1 Raven operator. We MIGHT get some limited engineer support if we're lucky, to help with perimeter berming.
No wonder we get emotional about keeping it so far behind the FLOT

The most "security" I've seen in a BSA was during JRTC with Bastogne when I was a lieutenant. We got 2 dismounted mortar teams assigned to the BSA. To help us against an armored OPFOR threat

Attempts have been made, obviously, to bridge the security platform gap. Bastogne did this huge push 2016-2017 to outfit all LMTV platforms with ringmounts and turrets to help the FSCs and BSB defend their LOGPAC convoys. But you need people to man those platforms.

And those platforms need to be able to move, to provide support across the AOR. They can't be emplaced in the perimeter or used as QRF. Implementing ring mounts on logistics platforms is a band-aid over a bullet wound, imo. It forces you to rob Peter to pay Paul.

Why then, wouldn't we attach a maneuver PLT or company of the Infantry or Armor variety to help augment our security needs?
I frankly have no fucking clue. Like I mentioned in a reply below, a SCO at the time got in his feelings about his cav scouts not getting to validate their

METs during the CTC because they'd be "babysitting the BSB."
I also think some of it has to do with BSB commanders not wanting to admit to their peers and bosses that they need support because the BSA is a softer target. Male egos will kill us all.

Additionally! Even if we were to use our LMTVs as security platforms, yall realize that like half of them aren't uparmored right? Biggest weapon system we can mount is a .50 which will mean fuck-all if we encounter an armored unit that met bypass criteria for the infantry unit

Maneuvering in front of the BSB.
So now we have sustainers in regular LMTVs with .50s (but probably M240s if we're being honest) engaging armored enemy dickheads on the way to the CTCPs to conduct multiple LOGPACs across the battlefield. White knuckling it is an understatement.

The risk to our logistics platforms is immense. The risk to our sustainment personnel is immense. The risk to the overall BCT mission is immense.
We talk about acceptable losses wrt the maneuver BNs, specifically the CABs. But they've got redundancies across 3ish BNs to ensure

The mission still happens. Not so in the BSB. Each organic company is 1 of 1 in the BCT. No redundancy whatsoever.

So I think my point is this.
We need to push the BSA closer to the FLOT to ensure that the Role 2 is properly leveraged.
We need a real security plan for the BSA besides LMTVs and ring mounts.
And we need to have the conversation at the BCT level on whether the main effort

Is willing to risk their sustainment health during decisive operations because one of the CABs wasn't willing to detach a few platoons to the BSA to help augment its security.