Read on Twitter
The latest thoughtful assessment of the nature of the Sino-US competition has generated interesting debates on the contribution of ideologic differences to that competition. @ElbridgeColby & Kaplan’s article frames things in a way I find appealing. https://twitter.com/foreignaffairs/status/1302733770609524737?s=21
The article’s main contribution, as I see it, is to weigh in on the ideology question, where it has sparked some valuable debate. Eg https://twitter.com/rushdoshi/status/1302361430587514886?s=21
(That said, I disagree about their characterization of the international economy…too close to 19th century mercantilism/imperial trade preferences to work today…but I digress)
This important discussion would improve w more precision about what we mean by ideology and how/where competition over divergent ideologies occurs. It is unquestionably the case that CCP sees western democratic ideals as a threat to its authoritarian rule at home, as many note.
That is not an unreasonable threat for the CCP to perceive in the current US environment, quite explicitly. (And prior to the current administration, Color Revolutions in the 2000s worried the CCP, and US support for them, while overstated in Beijing, existed.)
But that is not the same thing as China wanting to export a variant of both authoritarian & Marxist/Socialist ideology abroad as part of its FP. Competition for how third parties are governed/regulated would greatly expand the scope for conflict. (See Korean War, Vietnam War)
But the truly Marxist element of its FP is muted. This is not a minority viewpoint. Take it from the last two NIOs for East Asia. See @JohnCulver689’s take here https://twitter.com/johnculver689/status/1300751699229933570?s=21 and Paul Heer’s take http://www.theasanforum.org/understanding-the-challenge-from-china/
…or more recently and more briefly: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-donald-trump’s-‘strategic-approach’-china-wrong-162804
Or see plenty of scholars, like @jessicacweiss https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/04/no-china-us-arent-locked-an-ideological-battle-not-even-close/ Or scholar-practitioners, like Tom Christensen http://en.asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=50349
Beyond that, what the heck does Beijing’s ideology consist of? Socialism/Socialism w Chinese Characteristics/XJP Thought on SwCC in the New Era, what do they mean anyhow?
Jude Blanchette’s recently translated CCP Central Party School doc “Emphasizing and Strengthening the Party’s Ideological Work” would seem to be a good place to start https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-ccps-ideological-work
Nowhere in that document is there any class based analysis, class struggle, anti-capitalist/monopolist language, violent revolution, inherent imperialism of capitalism, nor any call for the workers of the world to unite.
Dictatorship of the proletariat? Well, a bit of that, sure, centering on the Party in the vanguard. (Or, emphasis on "dictatorship," not so much "proletariat”)
Instead, we find the CPS, the high church of CCP ideology worrying about CCP cadres LAUGHING at the concept of communism (p.7). (Houston (ok, Beijing), we have a problem).
Its description of Socialism is something that we see in plenty of EU economies (p 8-9). This is not the stuff of fundamental ideological competition.
(Separately, while Chinese economic reforms are certainly halting, a broader look at the definition of “reform” highlights their continuation in different ways that don’t solely privilege Zhongnanhai. See @EvanFeigenbaum at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/26/chinese-puzzle-why-economic-reform-in-xi-s-china-has-more-meanings-than-market-liberalization-pub-75668)
Distilled, ideology for the CCP centers on “just” authoritarianism, with some vague, unremarkable (outside the US) role for the state in econ. (“Just” given horror in Xinjiang, worry re Inner Mongolia, and gradual tragedy in HK…all part of sovereign Chinese territory, sadly).
(And yes, at home, the “model” of XJP Thought on SwCC in the NE also includes tech transfer via theft or coercion and national champions backed by a market of 1.4b. Those are, respectively, not things China advertises and not ideas China can export.)
So that ideological essence is not much of a unique selling point to most of the world. There is enough to be worried about in territorial terms. And focusing our attentions on those concerns, as @ElbridgeColby and Kaplan counsel, makes sense.
(Perhaps of interests as well to @AbeDenmark @PLMattis @BeijingPalmer @Scholars_Stage @MattSchrader_DC @Dalzell60 @resplinodell
Neither great nor middle powers will find that ideological package a basis for realignment. So it isn’t core to global Sino-US compet., unless US MUST overthrow CCP. Territory disputes (Taiwan, but others) & proximate, geographic spheres of interest deserve our intense attention.
