A brief rant to accompany my friend's tweet and post? Don't mind if I do. First, growing the Navy was one of the places where the President and I saw eye to eye, but only one of us was really dedicated to the proposition. Mattis didn't consider it a priority, Spencer didn't https://twitter.com/cdrsalamander/status/1306438146431877121

embrace it, and picking Mick Mulvaney as the second White House COS sealed the deal. Anyone remotely associated with the subject of building the Navy knew that to grow the fleet from 290 to 355 was a giant lift, and that buying that additional force structure consisted in a whole

lot more money than just building it. There were HUGE readiness holes in January 2017, and Mattis made it a priority to fill them--the right call in my view--but there was never any real effort made to disrupt the collegial distribution of defense resources necessary to privilege

seapower. So we had a President spouting a campaign promise (remember "Mexico will build the wall"?), a defense establishment not dedicated to making it happen, then--to be blunt--a series of disasters and scandals coming one after the other, that created a sense of doubt at OSD,

and the Hill--in the basic competence of the Navy. It wasn't just collisions, character, and Corona--it was the fact that the 30 year shipbuilding plan of record is the one produced in the final year of the Obama Administration. It was a series of shipbuilding failures, perceived

and actual. Not in my lifetime had I ever a sense that the Navy's basic ability to manage its affairs was in doubt, but those doubts were raised, and I was clearly not the only one with them. Even the Navy's vaunted, well-respected analytical arm came into disrepute, as whiz-kids

at OSD began steamrolling through Navy analysis that had the unhelpful quality of not supporting their narrative. There is a lot to unpack in @EsperDoD comments from yesterday, and much mischief remains in what was not said. That the percentage of the Navy budget devoted to

shipbuilding will increase is an interesting statement. Where that money comes from will be far more interesting.Will the money come from OSD topline? From additional OMB controls? Or will it come from within the Navy budget, a budget already too small for the force it supports.

Which accounts will be short-sheeted? Will current readiness decline? Will we buy fewer weapons? Will we slow down R and D? Better yet--will we cashier two aircraft carriers and "re-invest the savings"? There is much to be unpacked from what Esper said yesterday, and there

remains hard work to be done by Navy leaders to re-establish confidence in their leadership. The Navy needs more money or less mission. Winter is coming.