Start with one of international relations primary models for war: bargaining theory
The idea is the following: since war is costly (think of all the millions of people Mattis feared would die in a 🇰🇵🇺🇸 war), states have an incentive to "strike a bargain" that avoids war.
But this doesn't always happen...with devastating consequences
Essentially, it treats the "road to war" as a game of poker
And it treats the "onset of war" as a really, really, really bad "exit option" from bargaining.

States often avoid this exit option, but sometimes don't.
This is all well and good. But there is a problem:

Why does "exit option" == "Shooting one another"?
....or, I don't know, a rap battle?
In other words (and I know this is going to be controversial with folks), the bargaining model of war doesn't actually tell us why "war" happens. 🤔🤯
And Robert Powell wrote, "“The mechanisms are too general and too spare to explain particular outcomes in any degree of specificity.” https://www.amazon.com/Shadow-Power-Robert-Powell/dp/0691004579
This really shouldn't be surprising since the bargaining model of war is really just an extension of the models of labor disputes/strikes

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811091?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
In short, we are fortunate that war was avoided in August 2017. The missiles of August 2017 could have been far more devastating than the guns of August 1914.

But why one August ended in "peace" and the other in "war" is still a puzzle to international relations scholars.

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