With respect to @lynnekodonnell I am going to have to disagree with most of what was argued in this report.

THREAD https://twitter.com/Mr_Bahiss/status/1306343697043402753

TALIBAN FINANCES
The TB's financial trajectory precedes Mullah Yaqoub's debut. The Financial Commission has been active about one decade before Mullah Yaqoub.

The watershed moment for TB finances was 2015 when 2 events forced the TB to reconfigure their finances.

1. ISKP's emergence in AFG along with the announcement of death of Mullah Omar and subsequent infighting badly impacted TB finances. Many wealthy private donors either withheld donations or redirected them to ISKP.

Supported by Salafis in both Afghanistan and the region, ISKP was better placed to seek funding from wealthy Gulf donors.

2. A second reason was the friction between Taliban and Pakistan.

Following the death of Mullah Omar, Pakistan wanted to test the extent of its influence on the Taliban and, if possible, capitalise on its influence on the movement in talks with Kabul. Remember Murree talks.

Short version: with dwindling funds, expanding control over territory and tumultuous relations with Pakistan, TB started placing considerable emphasis on gaining autarky by self-funding in territories it controlled. Taliban had largely succeeded in this aim before talks with US.

TB's current blossoming relations means it can diversify its financial portfolio but if push came to shove, TB can survive simply on what it raises in AFG.

MULLAH YAQOUB's SUCCESSION

Despite media claims, this is far from a certain outcome. Mullah Yaqoub has certainly gained a lot of support within the movement and given that he was virtually unheard of before 2015 his rapid rise to power is profoundly awe-inducing.

But to argue that he is the natural successor to current Chief is incorrect. Mullah Berader's appointment in Doha and his continued diplomatic feats places him as the most likely successor from within the 3 deputies. He was & is far well known and well liked within rank&file.

Plus he will now be the main source of any foreign funds and likely outweighing any of Mullah Yaqoub's financial contributions.

But recent developments have me thinking about a fourth possible contender in the race for succession. That is none other than Mawlawi Abdul Hakim.

Mawlawi Hakim is TB chief's closest confidante and their political careers mirror each other remarkably. They both come from same religious backgrounds and followed similar political paths - even playing same roles in many aspects of the insurgency.

Thus far he was handicapped as he is not a named deputy within movement. But his appointment as chief negotiator propelled him to a powerful alternative to deputization. Should intra-Afghan talks succeed (at least to some level) Mawlawi Hakim will be credited for it.

This combined with the possibility that if TB were seeking 'continuity' after Sheikh Hibatullah, then they will naturally find this in Mawlawi Abdul Hakim.

His and Mullah Berader's political fortunes are highly interconnected with the results of current political developments.

But should these talks succeed, then both men IMO will be much better placed than Mullah Yaqoub in the race for succession.

TB and AQ
Lastly, I completely disagree with the report's findings that TB expanding financial power incentivises them to retain ties with AQ.

For the TB, financial inducement are possibly the least powerful inducement when it comes to AQ.

Financial support has never determined their core policies and unlikely to do so in foreseeable future.

Broadly, whether TB will enforce provisions of US-TB deal will likely be determined by US military conduct. If TB can ensure US withdrawal with minimal action against AQ...

then they will choose this path. Why? Because any open clash with AQ will have major ramifications for TB cohesion and unity.

But if US refuses to withdraw unless more concessions are made, then foreseeably TB might take a tougher stance against AQ (tho open clashes unlikely)

Another important factor in TB's enforcement of the deal will depend on outcome of intra-Afghan talks. If TB are happy with a post-talks settlement and see their core interests protected, they will likely be willing to take a very tough stance vis-à-vis AQ and other groups.

The blowback in such a scenario will be minimal as they can always deflect blame on other groups within the govt.

But if talks are seen to be failing and continued insurgency is seen as only viable option, TB will likely be induced to do bare minimum to ensure US withdrawal.

In such a scenario, we can expect them to be moving snail-paced on any commitments to test US patience and see whether US is genuinely committed to the provisions of the agreement or simply wanted a namesake agreement to allow for an end to its longest war. END