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That 100 estimate is kind of a fascinating thing. Although they would repeat the number, a lot of senior military and IC folks, when asked, will say they don& #39;t really know what there were supposedly 100 of/how "AQ fighters" was defined: Arab AQ fighters? Non-Afghan AQ fighters? https://twitter.com/CraigMWhitlock/status/1305876451812671488">https://twitter.com/CraigMWhi...
Here are three comments different counterterrorism officials made to me about the longstanding "100 AQ in Afghanistan" (now supposedly 200) estimate for my Pech book: a senior CIA official, an Obama NSC CT official, and a senior JSOC officer https://twitter.com/CraigMWhitlock/status/1305876451812671488?s=20">https://twitter.com/CraigMWhi...
A 2015 unclassified military report suggested that 100 was the number of AQ fighters (however defined) who stayed year-round in Kunar/Nuristan with Farouq al-Qahtani, and didn& #39;t count others who came into other eastern provinces for the warmer months.
These al-Qaida numbers are also only as good as USG& #39;s ability to accurately/consistently detect members of a clandestine group actively hiding from them in remote areas of rural Afghanistan: very bad then and still very bad now, that is. https://twitter.com/idreesali114/status/1305889062864158721?s=20">https://twitter.com/idreesali...
An example—a 2010 AQ tribute video to slain fighters named 3 Saudis who, acc. to their bios, had been fighting in Zabul/Paktika/Khost in 2006.
In 2006, US mil was only aware of AQ fighters in Kunar/Nuristan—which drove troop deployments, as this senior US commander recalled:
In 2006, US mil was only aware of AQ fighters in Kunar/Nuristan—which drove troop deployments, as this senior US commander recalled:
Abu Ikhlas al-Masri was a shiny object for US mil in Afg in 2002-7, drawing them deeper into Kunar.
But the very fact that he was so visible in HUMINT reporting should have been a red flag: he wasn& #39;t actually a key AQ figure. Those guys were staying farther below the radar.
But the very fact that he was so visible in HUMINT reporting should have been a red flag: he wasn& #39;t actually a key AQ figure. Those guys were staying farther below the radar.
Another Egyptian, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri, turns out to have been making visits into eastern Afg at the time. Unlike Abu Ikhlas, whose job was to liaise w/ Taliban, he was a senior AQ figure involved in overseas attack plots—& his OPSEC was therefore better & visits went undetected.
