"what evaluates the evaluator?" is a question one could consider as motivating a lot of Nietzsche's work on morality https://twitter.com/leaacta/status/1301820371046412290

once you admit that perspective matters in matters of morality, you might become curious to what degree this is the case, and will need to consider the antinomy of:

1. perspective only appears to matter for morality

2. perspective comprises the entirety of morality

in the first case, moral disagreements might be adjudicated by appeal to some external standard, which is somehow meaningfully authoritative despite differing perspectives on its legitimacy.

in the second case, we have a situation one step further advanced than vulgar moral relativism, because in this condition of complete "perspectivism", even moral relativism itself is one perspective among others & not adequate to the task of providing a meta-narrative.

one could imagine a synthetic position here, with something akin to a phenomenal/noumenal distinction at work in our knowledge of "what is moral", but I think the previous antinomy already clarifies what is at stake when thinking about our capacity for thinking & evaluating.

I probably shouldn't have used the example of *morality* here, because I think Nietzsche's sounding hammer taps on *correctness itself* & our faculty of judgment, generally. It is not just what is good, but what is true, that is cast into doubt.

Because our evaluative faculties also pass judgment in terms of correctness, not just in terms of "goodness". He offers an essentially evolutionary account of selection for "necessary errors" to explain why we judge as we do, all the while pointing out that:

our needing to believe it is not the same as it needing to be true.

However, one does wonder why certain ways of judging did, in fact, conduce to survival, and it is tempting to see GNON herself working behind those apparent patterns.

There is a compulsion philosophers have for seeking out so-called "logical necessities", which we cannot imagine being anything but true, and saying: the limits of my imagination are the limits of the world. Wittgenstein was less totalitarian when he said "of *my* world",

but the impulse feels related.

It's just not true, however, if you read it through the totalitarian lens. The world (for some value of "world") is not merely facts & not limited by language, and I believe his later work elaborates that observation to great effect.

I think we live & breathe in an unimaginable world, in which our propositional, logical understanding is a small part. It cuts well—it is our innermost & most subtle knife—but it is not our only tool & its work is not our only work, nor is its reach as far as we go.

I don't mean here to wave away the history of philosophy & the whole field of epistemology with some mystic quietism. Questions regarding our capacity for reason & the application thereof remain on the cutting edge of humanity's potential accomplishments, because those questions

have answers that might describe the shape of what we can hope to understand, and how we can hope to understand it. We can say a lot worth saying, and sometimes even say a lot *about* what cannot be said. That remains a frontier.