Due to the poisoning of A. Navalny, the German support for NS2 has returned to the spotlight. There have been calls on the German government to stop the investment. Below I share my few thoughts on the matter [THREAD]

1/14 https://twitter.com/AndersFoghR/status/1301223286949507076

1) It is unlikely that the investment, which is backed by Berlin despite the aggression on Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, etc., will lose the support after the attempted murder of Navalny.

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Merkel's recent firm statements should be understood, not only as a moral admonishment of what happened, but also as a dodge - the "strong reaction" will in no way affect NS2.

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After all, recently, when Navalny was already in a German hospital, Merkel expressed her support for NS2.

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2) It's a separate issue whether the German govt. can "block" NS2 now as it doesn't directly control any of the engaged companies, permits have been issued and only ~150 km of the pipe needs to be lain, etc. So, the answer to this question is no. Still, there is one "but".

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It is worth asking another question (we are entering the zone of political fiction - see point 1) - could the German government contribute (at one of the project's phases) to the failure of NS2 by withdrawing its political support? In my opinion - yes.

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In such a case the possible fiasco of the project, would not be caused by Germany's change of heart only. It could mean Berlin was sending a message that it would not engage in, e.g. defending European companies against US sanctions...

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...which would make it additionally difficult/impossible to finish NS2 (but it's just political fiction, also because of many other factors that could not be fit into this thread).

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3) Does this mean it makes sense to put pressure on Berlin over NS2? Definitely. Even if NS2 is not stopped (that's the ultimate goal, but it's Washington's call, not Berlin's), the pressure could force Germany...

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...to take into greater consideration the interests of CEE/Ukraine (e.g. vis-à-vis Russia) as a redress for NS2.

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4) Finally, an important issue regarding relations with Russia: at every stage of the investment Berlin failed to openly suggest that NS2 could lose support because of the Kremlin's aggressive policy.

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On the contrary: the focus was on undermining the arguments of NS2 opponents and ensuring this was "just business" and that the investment would be completed.

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In my opinion, if there is anything in this world that could impact the Kremlin, that would be e.g. a clear suggestion that Russians could not continue their aggressive policies and simultaneously hope for "business as usual".

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Would that work? Perhaps, but the main problem is, Germany has ever tried this.

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*never

ofc