Arguments between Polish historians on whether Poland could have avoided its disastrous fate in 1939 by allying itself with Germany against the Soviets (before the Stalin-Hitler pact) have an air of a complete detachment from reality about them, because they view Stalin, who was

actually the principal driving force of these events as essentially passive - almost completely lacking in agency. But in 1939 in every aspect that counted, economic resources, energy, number of troops, number of aircraft, number of tanks, quality of tanks etc, etc, the Soviet

Union was not only more powerful than Germany and Poland combined, but actually more powerful than all European powers combined. And in 1939 the Soviets inflicted a heavy defeat on the Japanese at Khalkin Gol, where they (thanks to the skills of general Grigori Shtern) actually

were the first to demonstrate the kind of rapid armoured “blitzkrieg” that became the hallmark of the Germans.
In fact, of course, the Red Army had hidden but deep weaknesses, but in 1938 and 39 nobody knew about them, they became only visible during the Winter War with Finland.

It was Stalin, conscious of his own superiority and Hitler’s impatience and adventurism, was carefully manipulating him with the aim of causing a war in Europe in which the Soviet Union would be a bystander until the capitalist powers have exhausted themselves. The idea that

Stalin would have just waited doing nothing and watched Germany and Poland prepare an anti-Soviet “crusade” makes one wonder about the people who imagine that live on the same planet.
In fact, as Mark Solonin has argued very convincingly, Stalin was ready to invade Poland in

1938 during the Munich crisis, had the Czechs decided to resist. The Soviet excuse was going to be Poland’s refusal to let Soviet troops march through to help Czechoslovakia and also Polish claims on Cieszyn. In fact, the Soviet Union handed an ultimatum to the Polish government

which it immediately forgot once it turned out the Czechs would not fight.
In fact, the Munich crisis was the last chance for Poland to save itself from the fate that awaited it, although one can only see this with hindsight. Had Poland at that time expressed. strong and

determined support for a Czechoslovakia, mobilised her troops and moved them to the German border, it is quite likely that Hitler would have had to give up his plan to annex the Sudetenland. That would expose Poland to the anger of its Brithis and French allies but there was one

important element that might have saved the situation and that was the plot by the senior german generals, which involved such key figures as the Chief of Staff Frank Halder, the commander of the Berlin military district general Erwin von Witzleben, the head of the Abwehr Admiral

Canaris and others. Had Hitler been humiliated at Munich, his prestige would have collapsed and there is a very high chance he could have been overthrown. Poland, of course, was not a major power in 1938 (though it was believed, even by the Germans, to have been stronger than it

actually was) but Germany was weak, still did not have a pact with Stalin (so could not know how he would react in the even of German-Polish war) which means that a Polish threat to go to war to protect the Treaty of Versailles, would have been taken seriously.