I'm back with my second book on China that I've read recently as I try to learn more: Robert Haddick's Fire on the Water, which I assumed would be more about naval warfare than it really is (not a critique, just a starting observation). https://twitter.com/Heather_at_ACTS/status/1295478079742185472

This work is an elaboration on a classified report he wrote about special ops in the region. I think that outsider perspective can be useful, although maybe experts in particular domains can point out areas of weakness because of it, although he is a retired Marine...

so I'd like to see what he thinks about it now. Haddick offers not a war plan but a "strategy for managing a peacetime competition." He says we should consider China's expected military capabilities, not intent. After all, that could always change, just as it could in the US.

After the fall of USSR, China now had the energy, resources, etc to solve many land border disputes and focus on maritime approaches from east & south, where it did NOT seek to solve territorial claims even as it had ceded land.

Haddick believes US should remain highly engaged in region because outside hegemons can better negotiate relationships between varying countries while continuing to maintain its legacy of keeping commons open for all

Haddick also assumes that US can convince China to accept status quo of a rules-based order. He also believes a "forward presence" of US mil=least costly & least risky strategy but that will no longer work as it has since in 1943 authors of JCS 570/2 began

setting up plan for large US bases around Eurasia to project power, already having purportedly given up notion of oceanic protection. Over time, reach has shrunk dramatically even as fighter bomber ration has gone from 2.5 to 1 to 12.3 to 1 by 2022. It has also been to fighter...

centric when it comes to thinking about air superiority. This was fine before the missile & sensor revolution. But USAF & USN keep pursuing range-limited aircraft (ex. successor to X-47B). Tomhawks also lack range and numbers. In 1st 6 weeks of Desert Storm, for ex, coalition hit

35,085 targets. Now imagine target set for China....We then get a bit of a history lesson. Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 1st to say, hey, watch out for China. 2010 report says get to work on "joint air-sea battle concept." Now the infamous salami slicing is only going up

But what to do when China is on home court? Plus the money game favors off missiles over def interceptors. Let's not get started on air base vulnerability, with conclusion that 30-40 strikes results in "severe degradation".

But current presence provides some regional deterrence because it helps prevent horizontal escalation. Surprisingly (at least for me), this book then shifts into focus for middle 1/3 of book. China began buying Russian Su-27/30 Flanker, which is equivalent to F-15, owning about

400 by today. The issue is their range of 1500 km, which puts 5 of 6 US air bases within range, making tankers and AWACS very vulnerable, which helps to establish where refueling line is for US short-legged fighters. J-20 is even worse, thought to have combat radius of 2000 KM.

That leaves low #s of Tomahawks & tiny bomber fleet. Meanwhile, China's SAR purportedly has resolution of 5 meters or less....so what to do? One solution (air-sea) was problematic because it focused on China's strengths instead of vulnerabilities. But as early as 2012 Dempsey

called for JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept), i.e. DOD has been multi-domaining for 8-ish years now. Whether or not ideas like "attack the enemy's space & cyber capabilities" is one point Haddick raises as possibly leading to escalation that will not end well for US, which

is more dependent on C2 and can't build in as much redundancy as China with continental adv. In short, air-sea depended on killing the archer before he/she could shoot the arrow, which is probably beyond US capabilities according to Haddick

Also, a blockade would hurt the US & everyone else likely as much as it would China, and sheer #s of shipping involved make it infeasible. All 3 approaches (JOAC, air-sea, & offshore control/blockade) also neglect potential assistance from nations in the regions and might even

alienate nations, thus they are not sound strategies.All of them also lack a "theory of success"--i.e. "what is the specific connection between the approaches' recommended actions and their desired results" and do they ID desired outcomes?

Alas, the "problem is usually deeper than just figuring out how to inflict damage on an adversary's military forces." Rather, one has to determine how to get an opponent to "accept conditions" they would have "rejected at the start of a conflict." Minds must be changed

And we can count outspending China into oblivion, as even whether we did that to USSR is open to debate. Haddick then calls for dev "full range of coercive capabilities" to include "creating internal instability" &creating capacity to strike deep in China vs offshore advocates

who rule out targeting mainland while focused on exploiting econ vulnerabilities, which Haddick, alas, says is too narrow of an approach vs determined adversary. Steps to be taken include better preparing for Chinese salami slicing & develop partnerships. Also interesting

in light of embrace of GPC he argues to prep for irregular warfare even as he points out that China prefers using conventional force for "signaling & intimidation rather than actual employment" & also because it makes sense if US ends up as "2nd-ranking mil player in the region"

Think sabotage of oil facilities in SCS & undersea data cables, etc.....even though he acknowledges this could be risky...but elsewhere he reiterates reassuring China re its "legitimate security concerns." Chap 8 & rest of book focus mostly on & and it is no happy read

In imagining warfare in SCS, he envisions that area being mostly off limits to "surface naval forces on either side," thus only allowing for "transient patrolling & raiding," which is best done by long-range. Don't @ me. A Marine wrote it, not me . Let me repeat....

"long-range airpower dominance=key to military success in East Asia." He also grounds it in need to dev "creative approach to the full range of attributes" ex. space

this is in part based on assumption that penetrating bomber has best chance of hitting underground/hardened mil facilities (remember, though, this is not a book about fighting war, it is mostly about deterring). But is this not the same problem he IDs re air sea?

Plus, re an earlier point, bomber=air superiority platform that can also patrol and "provide persistent coverage" (sounds expensive?). As such, it sounds perfect for ....ASW. Haddick suggests USN devote some of its $ for F-35s, P-8s, etc and also get into the B-21 game

to hold targets China s at risk. Might as well, because USN outclasses PLAN in deep waters. China's real ability to destroy USN is replete="land-based 'anti-navy' capabilities." It's not enough to sink the enemy's fleet. How do you suppress those land-based capabilities?

Haddick claims USN in current format is "largely out of the power projection business." I'm curious to hear what the naval experts think about this and some of the earlier claims @SubHistorian @rdwadle @EleeWakim And rail guns & lasers might "swing" off def balance other way, but

they will need new ships. One trump card=US subs, which Haddick says will be able to operate "at will against China's surface fleet." Again, Haddick doesn't see USN or PLAN playing "much of a role" in war. Rather, "maritime success" will be "defined by" if US can maintain FON

One solution=small, cheap "tripwire" ships otherwise US might end up "ceding these seas to China's control." Meanwhile, USMC should focus "left of boom" and focus on "shaping & improving security environment" before conflict breaks out in light of continuing territorial clashes.

MEUs can provide invaluable training assistance re China's salami slicing. In short, $ has to be spent on whatever can neutralize "China's land-based 'anti-navy' missiles and aircraft" including long-range, LOCAAS, LR cruise missiles, subs, survivable C2 for USAF & USN

to combat continental powers' ability to "deny important regions of the seas to others." The Pacific, controversially, is "now first an air & space theater." This paradigm must be accepted for a holistic strategy to develop. And we need to get used to adversary having potential

escalation dominance. TLDR? Bolster deterrence by investing in long-range& weapons to provide credible deterrent by showing ability to destroy valuable Chinese targets

The most important mission in region for US? "defending freedom of navigation in west Pacific"...while SCS/ECS becomes kind of WWI-esque no man's land