In COPR, Kant writes that the “I think” must be able to accompany all “my” representations, before explaining that Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination determines the Inner Sense in a way that I, as subject, perceive. I’m gonna think out loud here for a second.
As I understand it, the Synthesis of Apperception is what makes it possible for all “my” representations to belong to “me” in such a way that I have a moving window of experience, i.e. I experience identity persistence through time.
The Inner Sense is then determined when the understanding “imagines” or “figures” a manifold(?) in such a way that it can appear in the inner sense. The body receives intuitions through its senses, combines them with concepts, then loads them into consciousness. (I think?)
The main thing I’m confused about is—given that we experience only the determined inner sense and not the apperception itself, why must it be so that the “I think” must be able to accompany “my” representations? They aren’t “mine”, are they? Only what gets reproduced is mine, no?
This thread is more to record my questions than anything else. I imagine I’ll come back to it later (maybe much later) with a satisfactory answer, but good grief the Deduction is a pain to wrap one’s head around even the 4/5th time.
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