So I'm going to be that boring individual again and try and push the question to a more meta level. The key question, is 'why'.
Interestingly in a recent evidence gathering session at Wilton Park I was fortunate enough to contribute to it was argued the choice is false. 1/ https://twitter.com/edin_thinker/status/1297467954154659845

However, back to the meta. It is readily agreed upon that the UK no longer has the capacity to act in force (be it soft or hard), unilaterally at a global scale. This isn't new. A 1973 report opened with the line: 2/

"Over the past few years we have become increasingly aware of the need to contain public expenditure and to concentrate on priority activities and countries.”

Interestingly, the report identified a number of competitive areas for 'influence' that are identifiable today. 3/

These being:

1. "An increasing number of powers seek to project themselves on a world scale"
2. "Additionally, nationalism continues apace"
3. Increasing pressure to compete in:
-> Aid
-> Broadcasting
-> Cultural projection
-> Military assistance
-> Defence Capabilities

4/

The basic summary of the above issues for the UK stands true today:

"“There is room for doubt whether any middle sized power will be able to operate on a global scale in all these areas in the late 1970s.” 5/

So rather than arguing that we need to go this way or that because of the "international system", etc, it is probably better to identify what aspects of said system benefit Britain and focus on maintaining those. 6/

Naturally this will require some 'power by proxy', multilateral endeavours. And for this to succeed the UK will have to back and sustain interests that are not entirely beneficial to it, but are to gaining goodwill with colleagues and partners. 7/

However, it should be a strict calculation. As I've argued previously, standing "shoulder to shoulder" with a state continuously is not a policy in of itself. It has to lead somewhere. 8/

So when the debate becomes about regional prioritisation, I'd challenge those to ask why. And not to stop asking when we reach higher ideals like "values" and the "international system".

Because this is where you start deep diving into British strategic psyche. 9/

Through asking this question even of the high ideals, one can start to build a map of the variables that British policy makers, and to a lesser extent the public, attach importance to. 'What' is it that Britain identifies as power maintaining. Material? Or Prestige? 10/

Previously British 'grand principles' the data points referred to as measurement for British success, have been 'leadership' and 'global role' to facilitate, at its most basest level, a 'position of importance in the international system.' 11/

Now I believe this calculus, as old as 1945, is still used today. But if the IR is truly to be a massive strategic reset, it is only proper that we question whether this is the correct path to follow. Are there more efficient and less costly ways of facilitating these needs? 12/

It may be that the 'ways', those being 'leadership' and 'global role' are just too deeply ingrained to change. If so, are there better ways of facilitating these than the traditional methods that we often in defence commentary fall back on? 13/

Honestly I don't have a particular answer, I'm personally more interested in the process than the product. But this is the sort of thinking that should be continuously used as a check when discussing 'ends', 'ways' and 'means'. End/