Reading and live-tweeting through the @EpicGames antitrust lawsuit against @Apple, first reaction: Epic has come correct... They're represented by a former US DOJ Antitrust Division AAG *and* a former federal judge.
(Among other heavy hitters). Now about that mkt. definition...

The plaintiff's theory centers on harm to the "iOS App Distribution Market." That could be tricky; some courts are reluctant to find that a single brand can be a "market."

...which is unfortunate, b/c there's no reason why a single brand CAN'T be a market, especially when...

...products are very differentiated, as is definitely the case with iOS and Android. Of course, the anti-enforcement crowd will say "Omg there could never be a market for 'Apple apps'." They're wrong. This may be a good opportunity for a judge to correct that mistaken view.

As an aside, file this under "things I never thought I'd see in an antitrust complaint."

This is interesting: the complaint does not situate app developers as the "consumers" of iOS app distribution (the relevant product/market). Instead, Apple iOS is a "platform" connecting developers and end users, i.e., the "consumers."

Why is that interesting? B/c...

You'd think Epic would want to avoid any whiff of "platform"-type analysis, to avoid triggering the Supreme Court's awful Ohio v. AmEx decision. Instead, Epic could've tried to say "We buy the relevant product, which is iOS distribution services. So we're the consumers."

If I had to guess, Epic chose the "platform" path to make this look like the DC Circuit's Microsoft opinion in 2001. (And it does indeed look a lot like MSFT.)

This sounds like a "lock-in" theory, a la the Supreme Court's 1993 Kodak decision. Users who've already bought an iPhone already made their decision, and now the Apple App Store is their only choice.

(I suppose it's mandatory to note that Kodak was sharply criticized by most antitrust scholars. But I think it made some good points, and it's still good law.)

Eh, never been a fan of "sub-markets," but I get why the attorneys pleaded it this way.

Here it is. This is the heart of the complaint: app developers want to disintermediate Apple by distributing their own products directly to consumers. Apple blocks them.

It's strikingly similar to the DOJ's complaint against Microsoft in the late '90s.

More shades of Kodak (1993). Epic argues that smartphone users don't know upfront about everything Apple's going to do down the road. So Apple can't just say, "Hey, y'all could've bought an Android, so this market is perfectly competitive."

This is so delicious. Apple argues it needs to block smartphone users from directly downloading apps for "privacy and security" reasons. But Epic points out that Apple *doesn't* do that for Mac users, who get to download whatever they want(!)

A good reminder that it's usually the DEFENDANTS--not the plaintiffs--who are claiming that the market doesn't work on its own and requires "intervention" via contractual restrictions.

Again, very similar to Microsoft. Using power in an OS market (Windows / iOS) to stifle competition in a complementary market (browsers / in-app payments).

This is staggering. Apple is able to charge 10 times as much for in-app payment processing than companies like Square and PayPal charge for payment processing.

Whoa. Epic alleges Google--Apple's only smartphone OS rival--engages in similar anticompetitive conduct. So "competition" higher up the chain won't cure all the problems.

(An important point if Epic wants to rely on the Kodak decision.)

A few final notes on Epic-vs-Apple: Epic is not explicitly asking for $$. Smart move. Their whole argument is, "Just let us compete and good things will happen for everyone. (Except maybe Apple.)" So all they're asking for is that chance.

Finally, this case will test several hotly debated areas of antitrust:

(1) Kodak-style single-brand markets
(2) Kodak-style consumer lock-in
(3) Essential facilities
(4) Anticompetitive product design
(5) Tying (via contract & by design)

It's definitely worth watching.

In other words, Epic v. Apple is exactly the kind of case you might expect to see being brought by a newly invigorated, active antitrust enforcement agency. So... why can't we just leave enforcement up to private companies? Lots of reasons, but here's one:

This is an unusual fact pattern. Apple contracts don't require mandatory arbitration. If they had, this case would never see the light of day. Mandatory arb + class waiver (go it alone if you do arbitrate) are a significant hurdle to private enforcement.