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Have begun the retreat project of reading Brandom. This quote from the preface really rings true
This is now a Making It Explicit account.
Kicking things off with big B's account of the shift in perspective from Descartes to Kant—pithily, from properties to proprieties—which makes it possible to talk about distinctively sapient life as being fundamentally about _rules_ that govern judgment and action
Decartes Kant
representations rules
properties proprieties
descriptive prescriptive
substance authority
certainty necessity
our grip on ideas the grip of ideas on us
representations rules
properties proprieties
descriptive prescriptive
substance authority
certainty necessity
our grip on ideas the grip of ideas on us
Opening up a compelling question: _Why_ do ideas and concepts grip us so? From where springs their authority?
“Attributing an intentional state is attributing a normative status.”
I can feel the firewall between “is” and “ought” begin to tremble...
I can feel the firewall between “is” and “ought” begin to tremble...
I assume he’ll get around to it, but I can’t help but wonder about the source of the force. Maybe this is a worry about Nietzschean genealogical undermining. Or a worry about a hidden appeal to intuitions
He does reject a kind of rule-realism or Platonism about rules (“regulism”). Kant (and later Frege) mistakenly commit to a Platonist account because they are too sovereignpilled. The corrective is a pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox
Sovereignpilling, interestingly, seems to be an important part of the process. The reality of sovereign law had to be assumed before it could be revealed as constituted by an interpretive practice
