The U.S. administration is temporarily shifting from maximum pressure to minimum diplomacy in pursuit of the same goal: to kill off the Iran nuclear deal. Here’s what to watch as the U.S. introduces a UN resolution to extend arms restrictions due to expire in October. [thread]

2/ 2015 nuclear deal was unanimously endorsed by a Security Council resolution (2231) that set a 5 year expiration on restrictions for the transfer by & to Iran of conventional weapons. That milestone is coming up October 18.

3/ In recent days U.S. made push to expand the restriction into total embargo. Finding no takers, it revised the draft from expansion to straight, open-ended extension. The difference between the 2 is one draft that was doomed to fail & another that almost certainly won’t succeed

4/ If the US resolution predictably fails to gain traction, admin has a couple of options:

A. Present a less maximalist text or support a resolution from another council member proposing a compromise: say, calling for temporary rollover or focusing on specific weapons systems.

5/ But: China and Russia have opposed any revisions to the terms of resolution 2231 & could veto. Not to mention the Iranians, who will see this as another violation of JCPOA & could react in kind. Too, U.S. has shown little inclination towards serious compromise.

6/ Option B: Resolution 2231 has a built-in “snapback” mechanism that allows JCPOA parties claiming “significant non-performance” by another participant to restore all UN sanctions against Iran, including the arms limits.

7/ Here it gets murky: admin’s tortured case is that bc it's named as participant in 2231 it gets to apply snapback even tho it w/drew & said it was no longer a JCPOA participant. Other participants say that having withdrawn, the U.S. argument is disingenuous or plainly wrong.

8/ Most likely outcome after rancorous quarrel in New York is U.S. asserting sanctions have been restored; Russia & China saying they have not; and European nations doing their best to avoid grievous injury to Security Council.

9/If U.S. concern was truly mitigating security implications of embargo expiring, it had options: could engage potential weapons exporters to stop sale of most problematic weapons systems & focus on other UN resolutions limiting transfers in places like Yemen.

10/10 Demanding an indefinite extension and threatening snapback if it fails makes clear what has long been know: real objective is to try to bury JCPOA & make it that much harder for an eventual President Biden to revive it.