Over the last 2.5 years, I've been a part of disinformation research clusters on Russia, Turkey, Iran & the Gulf.

To understand disinformation *from* illiberal regimes, we must understand disinformation *within* illiberal regimes.

I argue how here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/13/fake-news-methods-change-faster-than-western-governments-can-react-heres-how-keep-up/

An increasing majority believes that:
a) Democracy is in danger globally,
b) Disinformation is one of the main threats against democracy,
c) Foreign meddling is one of the most important components of disinformation.
d) The majority of meddling originates from illiberal regimes

To address these problems, the overwhelming majority of the disinformation research community has focused on the effects of illiberal foreign meddling on liberal politics (elections, protests etc.)

Way too many researchers are still trying to reverse engineer 2016.

While these are necessary, I argue that so much focus on such a limited sample of countries and events obscures our full understanding of disinformation. We can learn far more from strategic disinformation interactions outside liberal regimes than within them.

Particularly because liberal regimes consistently argue that they can't cope with illiberal disinformation tactics and continuously get caught off-guard at every single turn.

So why don't we spend more time studying how illiberal regimes hone their disinformation skills?

There is a very clear skillset gap between liberal vs illiberal disinformation defence capacity and tactics. Illiberal regimes have more robust and adaptable disinformation management institutions compared to liberal regimes that build static Maginot lines.

One main reason why illiberal regimes are better in disinformation defence is that they perceive disinformation not as an anomaly, but a regular expression of strategic interaction. They don't try to get rid of it, nor do they treat it as something alien, or extrinsic to politics

This is important because they;
a) don't waste time on inherently doomed content-removal strategies,
b) don't get shocked every time they face disinformation,
c) can build more adaptable ad hoc information defence and counter-offence institutions

Obviously, there are two main challenges:
a) non-English, non-Latin disinformation research tools are still underdeveloped,
b) all disinformation is cultural, so such research clusters must include area/country specialists.

That said, overcoming these challenges is essential.

c) Funding streams are still very much behind on why we have maxed our understanding of disinformation from liberal regimes in 2016. Not much initiative towards funding non-Western disinformation projects, which, I think, is crazy.

To conclude we'll all have a clearer understanding of disinformation as a truly global phenomenon once we address these challenges and finally start building stronger disinformation defence systems/protocols *if* we study internal illiberal disinformation strategies better [/fin]