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A thread on the CPDJ and DPP merger that is, once again, a bit more complicated than it has any right to be. Specifically, Kagawa representative Tamaki Yuichiro is not following the party’s decision to merge, taking a few others with him to a new, as of yet unnamed party.
In 2017 the Democratic Party essentially split into a few different parties and groups. Although the CPDJ saw some successes along the way the electoral calculus simply does not allow for such a divided opposition if it wants to win anytime soon. Also here& #39;s the old mascot.
Seeing Abe’s power waning, a realignment to a single large party with smaller coalition partners has become front and center on the opposition agenda. It seemed as if this time it was going to work out, and yet it didn’t.
It doesn’t make sense for Tamaki to start a new party at this point—It is clear that only unified candidates can beat LDP incumbents. There are two main features of the current political landscape that I can point to: one is electoral incentives and the other strategy
First of all, following Stephen Day and Ian Neary’s paper from this year ( https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/120006863831/),">https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/1200... koenkai are a major irritant in the beginning phases of building a party. They incentivize a lawmaker to prioritize its own support network over building out the party’s.
They essentially “function to reduce the risks involved in leaving an old party or creating/joining a new one.” This explains a lot of the democratic party’s behavior since 2012, not only what we’re seeing today. That explains why DPP members have the option to defect,
but it doesn’t explain why they would do it. The second point is about strategy and to an extent ideology. It became clear in July that Tamaki wants the new unified party to put the lowering of the consumption tax at the front of its policy platform. This is a divisive issue.
Edano has repeatedly explained he does not want to consider this, and although the JCP is for abolishing the consumption tax it has not so far tried to stake its cooperation on this. The Tokyo gubernatorial elections similarly saw a large number of candidates focusing on taxation
In short, the CPDJ doesn’t want to end up in government having to enact a policy that would limit their fiscal capabilities. It is firmly for fiscal responsibility and does not ascribe to Reiwa’s MMT-inspired view of government spending.
Alternatively it may consider the populist nature of promising lowering consumption tax to be a slippery slope (see Bernhardt, Krasa, and Shadmer’s 2019 paper for this http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~mshadmehr/Demagogues%20and%20Democracy.pdf).But">https://moya.bus.miami.edu/~mshadmeh... the gist of it is that Tamaki simply doesn& #39;t believe the CPDJ can win without Reiwa
All in all what does this mean? Although it isn’t usually part of the coverage, this is a big victory for Yamamoto. His gambit to run in the Tokyo gubernatiorial elections despite knowing he would lose paid off big: enough people now think they can’t win without his cooperation
and he won’t give it without making the consumption tax the flagship issue of the opposition. If we take Day and Neary’s thesis to heart, then this is all still part of a long-term filtering process that will hopefully yield a strong opposition party.
But Tamaki’s decision to throw a wrench in the whole thing will extend this for even longer. Final note: CPDJ still gets a great deal out of this but is incurring costs as the merger has become less of a realignment and more of another episode in the soap opera of the dem. party
