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In my short piece published in @inkstickmedia, I argue that people are panicking about the wrong aspect of KSA’s nuclear program. While @nytimes and @wsj reporting about a covert uranium supply are concerning, the bigger problem is @iaeaorg safeguards in Saudi Arabia. 1/10 https://twitter.com/atomic_yozhik/status/1293571748265435136
KSA has a comprehensive SG agreement (CSA) required by the NPT. It signed its CSA in 2005 and it entered into force in 2009. It also has a small quantities protocol (SQP) that suspends most of the CSA’s reporting and inspection requirements. 2/10 https://ola.iaea.org/Applications/FactSheets/Country/Detail?code=SA
Saudi’s SQP was the last under the old model, amended in 2005 b/c it was too easy to qualify for, suspended too many SG requirements and expired only when quantities of nuc material breaches a certain threshold or when nuc material is in a facility. 3/10 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/27/safeguards-for-saudi-arabia-pub-77787
Under the new SQP, Saudi would have lost its SQP when it announced plans to build a nuclear facility, only a few years after its CSA and SQP entered into force. But under the old model, @iaeaorg can’t conduct normal early verification activities for embarking countries. 4/10
Unless Saudi Arabia elects to rescind its SQP at an early date, the IAEA’s work in painting a full picture of nuc material accountancy in the country will be harder, as will be assuring the kingdom’s neighbors of its peaceful intentions. Keeping the old SQP is just bad PR. 5/10
But Saudi Arabia may have its own motivations to do this in accordance with international norms. To rescind its SQP (and ideally conclude an additional protocol) would provide credible assurance that its nuclear program is only for energy and development. 6/10
This would clear a path for the major nuclear suppliers – China, France, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States – to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on nuclear development without raising alarms about proliferation in the Middle East. 7/10
Oil and gas generate nearly 60 percent of Saudi electricity, so adding nuclear power to its energy mix would allow the export of higher quantities of its oil. It could also produce produce medical isotopes and become a provider of clean water through desalination. 8/10
The rub is, there are at least two ways to play this. One way is with an old SQP, allegations of shady uranium deals and a very uncomfortable Iran. Another is with transparency, de facto standard safeguards and more development in the Middle East. I prefer the second. 9/10
Right now, the nuclear suppliers (also including Argentina) have a considerable opportunity to influence the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. I hope they take it quickly enough to let the IAEA in for early verification. 10/10
