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A thread about human performance (HP) and human factors (HF) in the context of the nuclear industry, but also elsewhere. 1/
I’ve previously wrote about some differences, as I see them, between human factors and human performance https://humanisticsystems.com/2019/04/24/human-factors-and-human-performance-whats-the-difference/ In short, the terms are related but refer to different things. It was to some pretty much spot on, and to other controversial. 2/
I’ve been involved in writing a couple guides on human performance for intergovernmental/international organisations and so clearly have a foot in that camp, as well as more generally in system performance (via human factors/ergonomics, psychology and other disciplines). 3/
Anyway, in March, the U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation issued a document called HUMAN FACTORS INTEGRATION, which makes a few pertinent comments on HF and HP. As this is a regulator, it’s worth considering seriously... http://www.onr.org.uk/operational/tech_asst_guides/ns-tast-gd-058.pdf 4/
The whole document is worth reading to understand HF in the nuclear industry, but for human performance, turn to section 5.5 to 5.9 and Appendix 2. 5/
Note that the ONR uses an adapted HSE definition of ‘human and organisational factors’, which equates to the ‘factors affecting humans’ type of HF that I wrote about here https://humanisticsystems.com/2017/09/18/four-kinds-of-human-factors-3-factors-affecting-humans/ 6/
The ONR wrote that “In recent years the term “human performance’ has evolved, and in some areas of the UK nuclear industry this term has been misinterpreted to mean something different than the widely recognised term ‘HF’ or ‘human and organisational factors.” 7/
The ONR want to avoid misinterpretation and misapplication, and state that “with reference to HFI, it is not helpful for an organisation to have separate disciplines of human performance and HF as this does not facilitate integration.” 8/
Both of these are really important points and have caused many reported problems. ONR has a Technical Position Statement titled ‘Putting Human Performance in Context with Organisational and Human Factors’ (Appendix 2). 9/
Here they go into more detail about the problem. “ONR considers that the industry is interpreting the term too narrowly with a focus on individual behaviours rather than the wider human and organisational factors that underpin effective performance.” 10/
They go on to say “Activities under the [human performance] banner are commonly not linked to other relevant work streams, and in some instances there remains the misconception that HF is ‘about safety cases’ and HU [human performance] is ‘about behaviours’.” 11/
This reinforces one of the differences-in-practice that I listed in the blog post: https://humanisticsystems.com/2019/04/24/human-factors-and-human-performance-whats-the-difference/ ie In practice, human performance tends to be more behavioural and more individual and team focused. 12/
Nothing wrong with that. It’s a specific lens, but as ONR wrote, “delivery of resilient organisational performance requires a holistic approach, with the integrated application of knowledge and skills across the field of human and organisational factors.” 13/
When it comes to personnel working on projects, ONR states, “Whilst SQEP criteria are commonly identified for HF specialists,, the requirements for HU [human performance] specialists are often less well defined.” I wrote a bit about this here for HF/E https://humanisticsystems.com/2018/06/05/suitably-qualified-and-experienced-five-questions-to-ask-a-commercial-human-factors-training-or-consultancy-provider/
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Finally, ONR wrote that human performance tools primarily intended to reducing human error. “These were initially targeted at front line workers ... ONR considers these tools to have merit but note that they are limited in their ability to deliver lasting improvements” 15/
The reason for this is “because they do not focus on the underlying organisational factors that give rise to the symptoms of poor performance.” Meaning, the tools in use in nuclear can be rather superficial, lacking a systems focus. 16/
The result can be that “When an organisation does not see a reduction in human error based events following implementation of a HU initiative, there can be a tendency to increase the focus on individual accountability” 17/
“This focus on individual accountability can be counter- productive as it can contribute to moving an organisation towards a blame culture and it fails to address the underlying factors.” 18/
What is actually needed is “an holistic and integrated approach to human and organisational factors.” That is, à systems based approach that goes beyond human performance and toward system performance. 19/
In general, while not embedded in the nuclear industry, I recognise these concerns and have seen them play out in transportation. In other fields, ‘human performance’ need not be concerned primarily with human error, but rather can be much more holistic, eg sport psychology. 20/
If other fields are to follow in considering human error as an umbrella or gathering point, it’s worth learning from the nuclear industry. While I identify more with ‘system performance’, much of my work does concern human performance and I approach that from various angles. 21/
Human factors is one angle, and one that I find rather comprehensive in its offering, but there are others, in psychology, ethnography, practice theory, systems thinking, management theory, etc. 22/
‘Human performance’ should really be a gathering point for such disciplines as well as applied operational experience. It shouldn’t go down the road of becoming a distinct discipline and should avoid practitioner accreditation schemes, separate teams, etc. 23/
Multiple perspectives are strength when it comes to understanding human performance, and system performance more generally. 24/
