(Thread)

"Objective yet RELATIONAL [emphasis added] approach".

For Carl Menger, economic value is predicated on valuing human beings to whom the ultimate standard of value is their own life. He imparts, in effect, a biocentric explanation of concept-formation. (1/9) https://twitter.com/RYCcomics/status/1290430570208661512

Austrians in the Misesian tradition affirm simply that value is subjective. The study of economic agents acting— and human action more broadly— is a strictly positive, non-normative, descriptive endeavour. Different value scales are assumed and revealed with every exchange. (2/9)

For Menger, economic values possess ontological underpinnings. For instance, imagine a colossal boulder set in the middle (and close proximity) of two individuals facing opposite directions. You could say its location is "subjective," subordinate to the observer's location. (3/9)

You could also say that its location is relational ( accounting for the spatial position of the two bystanders relative to it) YET [emphasis added] concurrently state that the boulder is, in effect, objectively located to the left or right of individual A and B. (4/9)

More importantly, this approach recognizes that if individuals A and B were both to regard this question as trivial and casually decided to run, headfirst and at maximum speeds, to their left and right, respectively, it would not be a great idea FOR THEM [emphasis added]. (5/9)

This interlocks with the original discussion, and the impetus driving it, in more ways than not. Should concepts, mathematical ones included, be regarded as arbitrary social contrivances, or do they describe and bear any relation to concrete, perceptual particulars? (6/9)

Let us ignore any discussion on the proper roles of additive operations and equality for a moment. One can, in principle, set up a system, or a great number of them, where "2+2=5" [if you define that 4=5, as you do in your elevator example, then it follows that 2+2=5]. (7/9)

But one can only derive utility from them if they map to concretes, or are related to other systems that do so, in some way [2 people+2 people= 5 interactions->2+2+1 interactions= 5 interactions, or 2 parents+2 children=3 child tickets->1+2 child tickets=3 child tickets]. (8/9)

This does not mean we have to accept Platonic or Aristotelian immanent views on universals and particulars. But any belief that deems concepts (again, mathematical ones included) as strictly nominal figments of one's imagination appears to be an equally poor explanation (9/9)