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One of our biggest problems is that 19th-century inheritances have become so ingrained as to be nearly unextractable. For example, the core building blocks of infantry, cavalry, & artillery, that over time had other & #39;multipliers& #39; added, like engineers, cyber, or public affairs.
If we were to begin again, tabula rasa, we& #39;d instead make what we currently think of as & #39;enablers& #39; - comms, cyber, information operations, etc - the core, and add multipliers like smaller, more elite combat arms formations to them.
There& #39;s no denying that lethal forces are a core competency of modern militaries. But they are less effective than in the past because reaching anything like a Clausewitzian & #39;decision& #39; is impossible because there are so many other ways for an adversary to resist.
Lethal forces of the future will be small, precise, agile, and flexible enough to respond to a variety of plug-and-play missions around the world. Call it the conventionalization of special operations forces, if you like.
Large formations of what we today consider conventional assets - the infantry, cavalry, and artillery building blocks - will become essentially just targets for swifter, more resilient, and more agile combat forces build around the new model.
Imagine the U.S. destruction of Saddam Hussein& #39;s 20th-century Soviet-style military in 1991, but on a grander scale.
And then come the sales pitches:
