Thread: looking a little deeper at Dai Xu’s article on the state of US-PRC relations. Some interesting assumptions and insights... https://gnews.org/257994/ 

First, there is very little understanding of US reasons on why it is behaving as it is. IP theft, broken promises, etc. “Pushy” & “ruthless”, indicating that past US administrations have not been particularly consistent at punishing these.

Second, the PRC is surprised at both US domestic uniamity over China and surprised that no international states have rallied behind Beijing.

Third, Dai says the US should not be thought of a “paper tiger” suggesting that at least some portion of CCP policy elites believed that up until the Trump Administration.

Fourth, the US should not be counted on to make strategic mistakes, it can self-correct, assuming that a portion of CCP elites view recent US strategy (Iraq? China itself?) as strategically mistaken.

Fifth, the US is more motivated by trade and economics than values. I think this is a major misreading of the US, both in the context of the Hong Kong Act and increasing disgust by previous China-watchers over Xinjiang.

Sixth, when trading with the US, try not to “win” as the Americans will fight back. This assumes that Dai himself believes that PRC trade policy toward the US was taking more than it was giving, perhaps deliberately so.

Seventh, announcing your intention to surpass the US will only make them compete even harder. Even if you are capable and willing to surpass the US, keep a low profile. This is classic Deng Xiaoping.

Eigth, though it is emotionally difficult to accept, PRC must accept the US is “No 1” in many areas. “America controls high technology. We are only in digestion and absorption of their technology. Do not tout “digestion and absorption” as ‘innovation’”. Interesting...

...as this one implies that he believes being No 2 is emotionally difficult for his compatriots and that a portion of CCP elites are misleading themselves as to the PRC’s actual technology accomplishments.

Ninth, the US becomes irate when PRC talks about “sharing information”, when really the PRC is absorbing technology and then lecturing Americans “who invented the internet”, like teaching your grandma to suck eggs. I think he’s saying don’t patronize the Americans about tech.

Tenth, the US is “a master in playing strategic games”, and once they are riled up, will pursue their enemies to the end (allusion to OBL?). Frankly, this is quite interesting bc it’s so far from what Americans think about themselves, tho By More than Providence debates this.

Interesting that he states that generations of presidents are willing to pursue these grand strategies so for those who debate the US’ ability to implement grand strategy, here’s at least one significant US-watcher who thinks we do.

Eleventh, the US “butterfly” effect. This is interesting as he indicates that the US alliances, networks, and values give it a downstream effect on anything it does. It’s actions are magnified downstream by its allies, which as the 5G issue is beginning to show, is true.

Conclusion, Dai Xu’s piece is at once complimentary to the US and also filled with a spirit of competition. There are interesting assumptions about the US that he calls out, which one can read as those he sees driving Xi’s policies. He is not advocating an outstretched hand tho

I’d suggest that he’s advising smarter competition, a return to low-profile, time-biding, recommending a strategic concession of US primacy to allay an US strategic response to a competition he believes China could lose.

Fascinating piece, and my concern is that US China-engagers have let China down as well as the US, because they have not spoken clearly to Chinese leaders and been open about the consequences of Chinese competition. They have bought into the strategic language used to allay a US

...strategic response, cooperation over climate change, win-win, etc, instead of actually understanding their own nation and warning a foreign nation of how it might respond if challenged openly. Either they’re declinists or idealists, but either way, they’ve failed to do their..

...job by giving honest advice to Chinese leaders. Also, interesting to note that implicit in this entire article is the same assumption made by many foreign powers with whom the US has gone to war. The US is more formidable than it seems.

I mention this because it indicates that perhaps the US pluralistic system is difficult for authoritarian states to read, meaning that perhaps the US is inadvertently inviting challenges because it looks messier, more chaotic, and weaker than it is...? Food for thought.
Over.