Read on Twitter
To take a break from Wiley for a moment, this is hugely disturbing.
An executive that regards judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of its actions as an inconvenience that needs to be curtailed is distinctly un-British.
One would expect this from Orban.
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/2020/07/24/boris-johnson-ready-curb-scope-power-judicial-reviews/ https://twitter.com/LordCFalconer/status/1286774915161559041
An executive that regards judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of its actions as an inconvenience that needs to be curtailed is distinctly un-British.
One would expect this from Orban.
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/2020/07/24/boris-johnson-ready-curb-scope-power-judicial-reviews/ https://twitter.com/LordCFalconer/status/1286774915161559041
I should expand on this.
The function of Parliament is to make law. Those laws grant powers to the Executive, which must exercise those powers within the boundaries set by law. The role of judicial review is to ensure that the Executive does not act unlawfully.
The function of Parliament is to make law. Those laws grant powers to the Executive, which must exercise those powers within the boundaries set by law. The role of judicial review is to ensure that the Executive does not act unlawfully.
Because of the complexity of state function, many of the laws which empower the Executive are increasingly made by statutory instrument: formally, and usually passively "approved" by Parliament.
Executive power can therefore only really be properly be curbed by judicial review.
Executive power can therefore only really be properly be curbed by judicial review.
The Government will argue that all it is doing is "restoring parliamentary sovereignty". But it is impossible for Parliament to scrutinise every statutory instrument.
They will also argue that the Government IS the will of Parliament. That is incorrect.
They will also argue that the Government IS the will of Parliament. That is incorrect.
From the Magna Carta (did she die in vain?) through the Case of Proclamations through the Glorious Revolution and on to the present day, the British constitution has developed to ensure that Executive power is always properly exercised, within its limits.
It is easy to understand why the Executive might resent the capacity of the law to hold its actions to account.
But that it should seek to do so is very un-British. It is also un-Conservative.
Burke would not have approved.
But that it should seek to do so is very un-British. It is also un-Conservative.
Burke would not have approved.
Our constitution rests, not on a single written document, but on conventions. Those conventions structure the framework or our liberal democracy.
The Executive can, of course, prevent courts from judging the legality of its actions.
But it should refrain from doing so.
The Executive can, of course, prevent courts from judging the legality of its actions.
But it should refrain from doing so.
In the 1970s, the Conservative future Lord Chancellor Lord Hailsham argued that the UK needed a written constitution that entrenched judicial scrutiny, to prevent abuse of executive power by the Labour Party.
In power, he decided that one was not needed after all.
In power, he decided that one was not needed after all.
But here's the catch.
Break the convention that underpins judicial scrutiny now, and you can be sure that this will set a precedent that will be further abused, by successive governments.
You may think that a future Corbyn will never take power and do that.
Don't be so sure.
Break the convention that underpins judicial scrutiny now, and you can be sure that this will set a precedent that will be further abused, by successive governments.
You may think that a future Corbyn will never take power and do that.
Don't be so sure.
