Why Member States not complying with Article 2 TEU values such as the rule of law is not just an issue of morality for those States and the EU, but an economic problem and threat to the integrity of the EU internal market. An (explainer) thread. /1

I’ll start with a sad and cynical observation: not everyone hears or cares about appeals that rely solely on moral values such as democracy, the rule of law, and rights. Some issues have to be reduced to economics before they will be heard. /2

In this thread, I make the case that Member States, such as Poland and Hungary, that breach fundamental EU values, and face no real consequences for doing so, constitute an economic problem for the EU and a danger to its Internal Market. /3

The breaches are well catalogued, but for the purposes of this argument, my main focus is on interference with the independence of national courts. /4

The purpose of the EU Internal Market is to remove barriers to the movement of persons, goods, services, and capital between Member States. The achievement of this aim depends to a large extent on the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law throughout all 27 Member States. /5

Uniformity means that EU rules mean the same thing in each Member State and effectiveness means that there are consequences and remedies where there are divergences that serve to punish and deter such divergence. /6

The uniformity and effectiveness of EU rules depends on a functioning judicial network. The CJEU in Luxembourg is the ultimate interpreter of the meaning of EU rules and national courts have a role in ensuring compliance with EU rules and CJEU rulings at national level. /7

A key procedure for this functioning judicial network is the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure. This allows national courts to refer questions on the interpretation/validity of EU rules (in some cases, final instance courts are under an obligation to refer). /8

In order to make a reference, a national court or tribunal must, among other things, be independent (so that it can apply the ruling without fear of national executive interference). Where such independence is not assured, the CJEU is not obliged to rule on the reference. /9

Where national courts can no longer be regarded as independent, a problem occurs, since the system relies heavily on voluntariness as regards the decision to refer to the CJEU and to comply with the CJEU ruling. /10