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Some interesting conclusions from #RussiaReport "This focus has led us to question who is responsible for broader work against the Russian threat and whether those organisations are sufficiently empowered to tackle a hostile state threat such as Russia." [1/15]
"...the way forward lies with taking action with our allies... The West is strongest when it acts collectively and that is the way in which we can best attach a cost to Putin’s actions." [2/15]
Accountability is an issue in particular...Indeed, there are a number of other Ministers with some form of responsibility for cyber...It makes for an unnecessarily complicated wiring diagram of responsibilities [3/15]
“prior to what we saw in the States, [Russian interference] wasn’t generally understood as a big threat to [electoral] processes” [4/15]
We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference...This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference [5/15]
[In early 2000s] Defence Intelligence viewed it similarly:
"So in terms of relative prioritisation, rather than losing focus … our coverage of Russia undoubtedly suffered as a consequence of that prioritisation, which was necessary for the conduct of military operations." [6/15]
"So in terms of relative prioritisation, rather than losing focus … our coverage of Russia undoubtedly suffered as a consequence of that prioritisation, which was necessary for the conduct of military operations." [6/15]
In 2016, the National Security Council approved a cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy. The latest iteration of the Strategy – in March 2019 – has an overarching long-term ‘vision’ of “A Russia that chooses to co-operate, rather than challenge or confront” [7/15]
The Strategy is ordered under five pillars – Protect, Constrain, Engage, Keep Open and Build. Responsibility for this implementation falls to the National Security Strategy Implementation Group for Russia, which comprises 14 departments and agencies. [8/15]
There also appear to be certain similarities between the struggle against terrorism and Hostile State Activity – particularly in terms of public awareness – and more could be done to leverage the Government’s experience on the former in relation to the latter. [9/15]
The Committee has heard a great deal over the past year about the Fusion Doctrine, ...We note, however, that Russia’s own version of this ‘joined-up working’ approach is far more developed ... [10/15]
Something we discuss here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/fusion-doctrine-in-five-steps-lessons-learned-from-remote-warfare-in-africa
Something we discuss here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/fusion-doctrine-in-five-steps-lessons-learned-from-remote-warfare-in-africa
We asked the Agencies and Defence Intelligence to assess their current performance against the strategic objectives and plans in place in relation to the Russian threat. ... the Agencies could not provide an equally clear assessment [11/15]
[oversight] has, to a certain extent, been hampered by the organisations we oversee referring frequently in oral evidence to the exemption (in the Justice and Security Act 2013) for information that relates to ongoing operations... [12/15]
...We remind the Government that the Justice and Security Act 2013 does not oblige it to withhold information relevant to ongoing operations but merely provides the option of doing so. [13/15]
Something we discuss here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/all-quiet-on-the-isis-front-british-secret-warfare-in-an-information-age
And here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/britains-shadow-army-policy-options-for-external-oversight-of-uk-special-forces
Something we discuss here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/all-quiet-on-the-isis-front-british-secret-warfare-in-an-information-age
And here: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/britains-shadow-army-policy-options-for-external-oversight-of-uk-special-forces
We are encouraged to note that Defence Intelligence shares its intelligence assessments with NATO, which we were told aim to try “to ensure as common an understanding of the nature of the Russian threat and situation that we face” [14/15]
[15/15]
We discussed some of these issues in a recent briefing: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/questions-for-the-integrated-review-2-how-to-engage-deep-and-narrow-or-wide-and-shallow
We discussed some of these issues in a recent briefing: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/questions-for-the-integrated-review-2-how-to-engage-deep-and-narrow-or-wide-and-shallow
