So....yeah. #CdnNatSec. WTF is happening, you ask? Well, here's my take. (N.B: for legal analysis, I'm deferring to @leahwest_nsl and @MichaelJNesbitt ). This thread will comment on some of the more operational matters of the @csiscanada decision.

https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/482466/index.do

So...turns out that CSIS has been breaking Canadian law. But it maybe didn't know that, or chose not to know that, or something. (See above). What did they do? Ohhhh there's a handy chart for that:

Provision of funds to terrorists. Provision of funds to sources who provided funds to terrorists. Provision of other material that could be useful (like cell phones). These are all illegal under the Canadian criminal code.

Why would CSIS do this, you ask? It's all about access and bona fides. If you want access to a terrorist network, you have to provide them with something they want. In some cases, this will be funds.

A great example is the case of the Toronto18. In that case, a police informant provided the group with firearms and bullets. This was a considered risk, and one that granted him privileged access.

During this whole debacle, this operational activity stopped twice. Once, during 2017, while waiting for a legal opinion that never came. https://twitter.com/Colinfreeze/status/1283778574932156416?s=20

The second was in 2019. This type of operational activity stopped for SIX MONTHS while waiting for C59 to pass...which it did, with no time to spare.

https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/federal-court-decision.html

SIX MONTHS. Some operational activity was suspended. I'm really shocked by this, particularly since this has been a legal issue for years. This could have had serious implications for those operations and the individuals involved, particularly sources.

Now, I know that CSIS would have worked hard to prevent any compromise to the integrity of operations, but this added an additional layer to an already complex operating environment. And let's not forget that there are quite a number of threats that CSIS has to investigate.

I see two things here. 1) CSIS needs timely and relevant legal advice to enable operations. I hope this decision helps to change whatever is preventing that from happening.

2) We need to prevent this from happening again. That likely means more regular reviews of #CdnNatSec legislation and proactively addressing these issues. We can't do one update every two decades when technology and techniques change weekly.

From an ethics perspective, this case seems to demonstrate that CSIS opted for expediency over just authority until they were explicitly told they did not have that authority. That's bad, and it was preventable.