THREAD As Lebanon’s suffering seems to swell endlessly, it is important to remind ourselves that the country is in fact undergoing a transition from one model to another. The former was always unsustainable; the latter is begging to be born

The political class will predictably hamper this transformation, but cannot prevent it altogether. It will occur to a large extent mechanically, driven by forces which no amount of propaganda, obstruction, or clientelism can hold back

Much is already changing, presenting a double-edged mix of frightening loss and potential gain. Lebanon’s gigantic trade deficit, for example, has shrunk spectacularly, which sadly reflects plummeting purchasing power. But…

It also reduces pressure on the pound; reflects a shift toward consumption of local products; and decreases the volume of exports Lebanon needs to break even, acquire dollars through trade, and diminish its dependence on financial engineering and foreign aid

The country’s bankruptcy spells the end of an economy almost entirely based on debt, simply because no one will again lend or deposit foreign currency frivolously. As the rent economy dies, more productive alternatives will necessarily take shape

Meanwhile, this crisis will have a paradoxical impact on Lebanon’s longstanding brain-drain. While some young Lebanese will flee the crisis, many more will be forced to find their way at home, given the rising costs of travel, studies, and upkeep abroad.

This youth need not be forsaken: Growing space for productive ventures will emerge, if only due to improving price competitivity in such fields as agribusiness geared toward exports, various forms of tourism, and services that could target the European market

This evolution could mean that Lebanon would finally present graduates with something besides the old dilemma: leave or lower your expectations. The latter option has reduced the state to a vast reservoir of low-paid jobs for those who stayed

In parallel, the transition will inevitably curb a range of insidious yet entrenched practices, such as the abusive reliance on foreign labor; rampant use of private cars; and pervasive privatization of services, from education to health through to water and electricity

Adjustments will be slow and painful. They will pose squarely the question of the public sector, which has suffered not just from nepotism and cronyism, but from uniquely low expectations and accountability, given private substitutes ironically subsidized by the state

Some things are clearly changing for the worse: The financial sector is now packed with zombie banks, whose sole raison d’etre is to protect rich shareholders at the expense of any financial services per se. Oligarchs are using poverty to consolidate their empires

And some things likely won’t change at all. Political factions enjoy reflexive support from loyalists, even as they organize society’s descent into misery. The security services will remain subservient, and the bureaucracy more obstructive than functional

Yet there is also good news to be found in continuity. Lebanese may not be resilient—a hollow word used to justify every form of complacency—but many are indeed indefatigable and entrepreneurial. Even small signs of progress may trigger defiant optimism

An expansive, economically successful diaspora is more than ready to help. Its remittances from now on will serve more productive functions than underwriting speculative financial practices and subsidizing import-based consumerism that has gutted the local economy

Lebanon also retains a truly unique ability to brand itself internationally—a talent it has abused in the past, to the point of alienating many a friend taken for a ride. The current crisis is a reset, creating the context for healthier and more balanced relationships

The transition underway is slowed by various factors: the crushing losses people must reckon with; the mesmerizing sight of ruling elites whose greed and nihilism can only leave everyone aghast; and faint hopes that something may happen to forestall the inevitable

Perhaps the most damaging factor, however, is the Lebanese pound’s volatility: Due to multiple exchange rates, slow-motion devaluation, and the lack of confidence-building measures, most goods are now wildly over- or underpriced. In other words, nothing has recognizable value

The ultimate exchange rate is beside the point: What is needed is a transparent market that would allow for some equilibrium to emerge. From there, goods, services, and salaries can be adjusted and zeros knocked off, if need be. The pound must hit the bottom for people to rebound

There is no understating how brutal this transition is and will be. But the only way to reduce the pain, absent a responsible ruling class, is to reach an economy where at least things can be bought and sold with relative predictability. Society will remain paralyzed until then

Lebanon’s quandary is captured in how much has been built while never filling the void: endless apartment blocks with no infrastructure to service them; countless banks shunning productive investments; ubiquitous restaurants that conceal profound food insecurity

This emptiness, which has become so visible of late, is what understandably scares every Lebanese. But it is also the country’s best asset. A talented country that grows little and makes even less is not a wasteland: It is a place of boundless potential