Read on Twitter
Chapter 3 of the @18airbornecorps Twitter novel focuses on one of the most fascinating & contentious periods in U.S. civ-mil relations history.
Although both Ike and Ridgway made missteps during this era, it illustrates many important insights about U.S. civ-mil relations. 1/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016307970056192
Although both Ike and Ridgway made missteps during this era, it illustrates many important insights about U.S. civ-mil relations. 1/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016307970056192
First, where you stand depends on where you sit.
Ridgway was consumed not only by strategic concerns, but also by the health — and even existence — of the Army as it was structured.
Whereas Ridgway was only focused on military concerns & threat, Ike saw a bigger picture. 2/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016325972013062
Ridgway was consumed not only by strategic concerns, but also by the health — and even existence — of the Army as it was structured.
Whereas Ridgway was only focused on military concerns & threat, Ike saw a bigger picture. 2/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016325972013062
Ridgway thought decisions about Army structure must be dictated by threat alone; costs shouldn’t be a driving factor.
Despite being a retired General, Ike faced post-war budget challenges and needed a strategy to balance budgets & maintain national security—& his re-election. 3/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016367118090242
Despite being a retired General, Ike faced post-war budget challenges and needed a strategy to balance budgets & maintain national security—& his re-election. 3/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283016367118090242
There is always this friction in civ-mil relations, but Ridway failed to account for political realities — largely because he wasn’t in a position that required him to do so.
For all the virtue of Ridgway’s military logic, his strategy was simply not politically sustainable.
4/
For all the virtue of Ridgway’s military logic, his strategy was simply not politically sustainable.
4/
Second, civilians have the right to be wrong — and they sometimes are because they have to choose where to accept risk.
Ridgway saw real threats to the Army as an institution, and the need for options against threats that could materialize. Ike downplayed these threats. 5/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019739321765889
Ridgway saw real threats to the Army as an institution, and the need for options against threats that could materialize. Ike downplayed these threats. 5/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019739321765889
Although Ike got the political-strategic picture right and set the U.S. on an economic footing to compete against the Soviets, he accepted risks — many of which materialized — to the health of the Army.
And his strategy left future political leaders with a lack of options. 6/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019749950132224
And his strategy left future political leaders with a lack of options. 6/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019749950132224
Third, mil leaders have to develop options consistent with political reality.
Ridgway continued to resist Ike, making no serious attempt to accommodate Ike’s vision or adapt the Army to operate within it, even after Ike’s decision was made, announced, and implemented. 7/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019741058211841
Ridgway continued to resist Ike, making no serious attempt to accommodate Ike’s vision or adapt the Army to operate within it, even after Ike’s decision was made, announced, and implemented. 7/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019741058211841
There was nothing wrong with Ridgway voicing private concerns.
His bigger failure, however, was that he ALSO failed to develop new alternatives for the Army that could operate within the current strategy.
How could the Army mitigate the risks he saw even with Ike’s approach? 8/
His bigger failure, however, was that he ALSO failed to develop new alternatives for the Army that could operate within the current strategy.
How could the Army mitigate the risks he saw even with Ike’s approach? 8/
Ridgway’s resistance to developing ways that could allow the Army to retain institutional knowledge, mobilize rapidly, and develop a foundation that could operate within the strategy did significant damage to his relationship with Ike & the Army’s ability to adapt later. 9/
In other words, sometimes Army leaders need to develop options that are “suboptimal” from a military standpoint in order to serve the strategic process.
Ridgway’s unwillingness to do so further increased the risks facing the Army. 10/
Ridgway’s unwillingness to do so further increased the risks facing the Army. 10/
Fourth, the President isn’t the only civilian in civilian control — a lesson Ike sometimes forgot.
In ‘53-54, Ike had a GOP Congress, giving him a stronger hand. Faced with renewed opposition in ‘55, Ridgway became more comfortable voicing his concerns with Senators. 11/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019751661408263
In ‘53-54, Ike had a GOP Congress, giving him a stronger hand. Faced with renewed opposition in ‘55, Ridgway became more comfortable voicing his concerns with Senators. 11/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019751661408263
Sharing unfiltered views with members of Congress isn’t necessarily inappropriate. In fact, it’s a Constitutional obligation for senior officers.
Yet Ike grew incensed with Ridgway, and expected loyalty to himself and his strategy.
Ridgway, rightly, didn’t agree. 12/
Yet Ike grew incensed with Ridgway, and expected loyalty to himself and his strategy.
Ridgway, rightly, didn’t agree. 12/
But Ridway took this too far in my view.
Sharing opinions with members of Congress is not inappropriate, but refusing to develop alternative options within the strategy and actively working to undermine Ike’s strategy also ignored his duties as a presidential advisor. 13/
Sharing opinions with members of Congress is not inappropriate, but refusing to develop alternative options within the strategy and actively working to undermine Ike’s strategy also ignored his duties as a presidential advisor. 13/
As President’s often have done in US history when they believe their advisors are not providing them with advice relevant to political circumstances, Ike turned to other officers who would. 14/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019767511744512
But this came at a cost to the Army as an institution.
Ridgway’s preoccupation with budget size, end strength, and overall strategy caused the Army to lose time developing ideas and concepts that could later be implemented. And it cost the Army a seat at the table. 15/
Ridgway’s preoccupation with budget size, end strength, and overall strategy caused the Army to lose time developing ideas and concepts that could later be implemented. And it cost the Army a seat at the table. 15/
Just as importantly, it eroded any influence he might have had in mitigating risk within the strategy and it ultimately led Ike not to reappoint Ridgway to a customary second term as Army Chief. 16/ https://twitter.com/18airbornecorps/status/1283019767511744512
Although Ike was a retired General, he clearly made the transition to civilian partisan leader. He campaigned on the issues and took a much broader view than Ridgway did.
Given such a massive strategic shift, friction and conflict were inevitable. 17/
Given such a massive strategic shift, friction and conflict were inevitable. 17/
But Ridgway ultimately failed as an advisor, instead placing himself as an opponent of the strategy.
He may have felt Ike’s strategy was simply too risky, but by ignoring political realities he ironically put the Army in an even worse position for the following decades. 18/18
He may have felt Ike’s strategy was simply too risky, but by ignoring political realities he ironically put the Army in an even worse position for the following decades. 18/18
