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1) What does Biosafety Laboratory Director Zhiming Yuan at the Wuhan Institute of Virology really think? The man who claims "not even a mosquito can fly in" through the BSL4 lab. This megathread will explore the truth about WIV biosafety #COVID19
2) WIV was approved in 2003 to respond to the SARS epidemic at a cost of 300 million yuan (US$44 million). The project was a joint Sino-French venture to design and construct China's first BSL-4 lab. https://www.nature.com/news/inside-the-chinese-lab-poised-to-study-world-s-most-dangerous-pathogens-1.21487
3) WIV and the new BSL-4 Biosecurity lab were eventually completed on June 16, 2016. The French Ambassador to China bestowed two National merit medals on Professor Zhiming Yuan and Professor Zhengli Shi. http://english.whiov.cas.cn/ne/201712/t20171214_187892.html
4) Yet Professor Zhiming Yuan and Professor Zhengli Shi had serious concerns about Biosafety at the new lab. In July 2018, Yuan and Shi published a paper entitled "Quality management in a high-containment laboratory". https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2588933818300062
5) Yuan and Shi's paper on Biosecurity recognized a conflict between Chinese, European, and WHO standards for BSL-4 accreditation. Although WIV was accredited in 2017 by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment, a question arose:
6) "Because no international dedicated standard exists for biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories, this paper explains the desire of the laboratory’s director to set up a quality management system (QMS) to accredit this first level 4 containment laboratory in China ..."
7) "Accreditation of a biocontainment laboratory in accordance with an international standard is a real challenge. No suitable standard exists... This approach, undertaken by the WIV for its level 4 containment laboratory, is quite original..."
8) " ... the Chinese GB 19489:2008 standard is taken into account to address two key concerns: on the one hand, to comply with Chinese legislation involving this standard, and on the other hand, to improve the level of detail in the laboratory’s documentation system ... "
9) Yuan also led the Biosecurity training protocols at WIV, including development of the BSL-4 Laboratory User Training Program and Manual https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31002302/
10) Yuan was also integral to the Biosecurity protocols for handling SARS at the WIV. With Zhengli Shi, the two published another article in2018 entitled "Evaluation of MICRO-CHEM PLUS as a Disinfectant for Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory in China" https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1535676018758891
11) Yuan and Shi tested a sterilizing solvent to inactivate SARS (CoV) WIV1, specifically for the purpose of maintaining Biosecurity in the new lab "to protect personnel from exposure and to prevent infectious agents from leaking outside BSL-4 laboratories ..."
12) The need for an effective sterilizing agent was critical for two stages: having an effective disinfectant for waste treatment and the chemical shower. The study noted "No loss of efficacy was detected for 5% MCP at a temperature of 0°C, ambient, or 37°C ..."
13) "... or 37°C or in the solution of pH 3.2 to 12.2. No interference to disinfection efficacy was detected with up to 25% fetal bovine serum, 5% bovine serum albumin, or 8% cell debris."
14) Yet issues with deactivating SARS coronaviruses in a lab have existed since 2003, when there were at least two lab leaks in Beijing and Anhui Province https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/view/investigation-chinas-recent-sars-outbreak-yields-important-lessons
15) Through an investigation with the WHO, the National Institute of Virology in Beijing was identified as the most likely source of the outbreaks. The virus was not effectively inactivated before being removed from a BSL-3 Lab
16) ''In light of the investigation, WHO believes that Member States should carefully review biosafety standards and strengthen them to avoid further incidents,'' said Dr Shigeru Omi, regional director of WHO's Western Pacific Region.
17) Although WHO pledged to develop further standards after the 2003 incidents, Yuan and Shi's paper from 2018 about the lack of international standards suggests the SARS deactivation issues were not addressed: https://twitter.com/liljurist/status/1281074551485419520?s=20
18) The importance of sterilizing contaminated fluid from labs studying highly dangerous pathogens is evidenced by leaks from numerous high-security labs around the world. In August 2007, contamination of foot-and-mouth disease was discovered at several farms in the U.K.
19) At a BSL-4 lab in Pirbright, an investigation revealed "damage and leakage of the drainage system servicing the site, including cracked and leaky pipes, displaced joints,
debris buildup, and tree root ingress" allowed waste water to leak https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/117997.pdf
debris buildup, and tree root ingress" allowed waste water to leak https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/117997.pdf
20) In the US, the BSL-4 lab at Fort Detrick has suffered from leaks and shutdowns to its steam-based waste water treatment process that has resulted in multiple leaks from the facility. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1995/05/14/fort-detrick-sewer-leak-raises-questions/c981c749-837d-4e36-b934-f227a2ab0ca8/
A lot to digest and consider for now, more to follow...
