1. When it comes to Chinese the Indian response is constrained by multiple factors, some of the government's making, some not.

One major factor is pure military power.

To take on China, India needs an alliance structure. It is part of none.

2. When India took on Pakistan (a much smaller power, but allied to both the US and China) in 1971, it took out an insurance with a treaty with the USSR.

We paid for it when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and we lost moral standing, but no such deal is problem-free.

3. Today Russia is out of the picture. It is unlikely to back a challenge to China, with whom it is deeply intertwined (see the SCO, and Central Asia - which Russia does not want as part of the US sphere).

That leaves the US and the dreams of the Quad (US, Japan, Aus and India).

4. The US under the current administration is a challenge, to put it lightly.

Even under sympathetic administrations it would remain so, for example David Headley remains out of reach for India.

Our geographic positions lead to very different interests at times.

5. Then there is the Quad, but it is not without its problems, principally the fact that both Australia & Japan are deeply disliked in their specific regions.

Australia's racism (supercharged by a Murdoch press) is a serious issue, including linked to the Christchurch attack.

6. Japan, always somewhat isolated because of its unwillingness to face up to its war crimes in WWII, has doubled down on this under Abe.

The reality of a Quad would lead to many countries pushing away from these countries. It would give China leverage.

7. Without a straightforward military option, there is the business and money option.

Unfortunately the government has undermined the RBI, the SC gives orders favouring certain oligopolistic companies, and the less said about demonitisation the better.

8. There is no rush of companies coming to set up shop in India, undermined both by a global loss of "easy money", stalled banking reforms, and a government that seems to care more about big business houses than actual ease of business and trade.

Bad policing doesn't help.

9. This leaves the third option, of an alliance that is worried about Chinese hegemonistic approach and its closed political system.

Small countries can bandwagon together to oppose significantly more powerful ones, if the cause is well articulated.

10. Post independence India was able to leverage this as part of an anti-colonial alliance.

Colonised countries, and just post-colonial countries, were amongst the poorest and weakest in the system, but they still managed a successful pushback.

11. Today a number of countries including the EU, are worried about China (the UK doesn't seem to be, but beggars can't be choosers if you want to do Brexit).

It would be ideal to have had a strong network of countries opposing China's disturbing acts in Xinjiang, HK and Tibet.

12. But to credibly take such a stand India would have to promote human rights defenders, push for accountability, encourage a free press, stand for universal values.

All of these things have been under consistent and sustained attack under this regime.

13. What credibility does India have to oppose China undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong when it is playing from the same playbook in Kashmir?

Who is going to believe it is interested in human rights when its police murdered 5 prisoners in custoday a day in 2019?

14. How is India going to convince other countries to oppose China's hegemonistic demands when it behaves in a similar manner with its neighbours?

India folding in front of Chinese belligerence isn't just a testament to this regime's cowardice, but also a result of its failures.

15. The core necessity for foreign policy is to have tools to make it happen.

These are found in treaties, in military preparedness, in a healthy economy, and the hard-to-measure detail of reputation.

This regime defines success by different parameters.

16. One of the "successes" of Jaishankar's stint as Ambassador to the US was to undercut the liberal NRI network in US west coast academia by rallying the IT crowd.

Today that liberal network would be worth its price in gold against China's illiberalism.

We don't have it.

17. A regime that measures its success in beating down domestic opposition, whose sole agenda seems to revolve around that, is hardly going to be able to play a global role. Egypt's dictatorship is eloquent testimony to that.

We need to be better, if only for selfish reasons.