Some thoughts on Espinoza: I love this decision as a policy matter - I attended a religious elementary/middle school and am so glad other kids will get that chance. But legally, I am skeptical, for the reasons Justice Ginsburg explains in her very concise but powerful dissent. 1/

I do think that, if one accepts (as all the justices appear to) that "prohibit" includes burdens, not just outright proscription, and "exercise of religion" includes acts, not only beliefs, then the majority& #39;s sentence below follows quite ineluctably from sheer textual logic. 2/

(The original meaning of "prohibiting" in the First Amendment is actually a very interesting question, but I will save discussion of that for another time.) 3/

To distinguish Locke v. Davey, however, the majority took a more roundabout journey than the simple logic above. Strained to classify discrim. as based on schools& #39; religious status, even though as Breyer notes the rights at issue are those of parents, not schools: 4/

As Gorsuch notes, the discrimination is probably better classified as based on religious use. Court could reach the same result but in a more logically sound way. However, the court clearly doesn& #39;t want to overrule Locke v. Davey, which I suppose is understandable. 5/

That said, as I noted at the beginning of this thread, I am not entirely convinced that there actually was any discrimination in *this case*, whatever else might occur in future cases. 6/