I am slightly bemused that this article (not all of which I agree with) has elicited a wave of “actually, Brexit was good for the UK’s China policy, it has now been freed from the EU shackles” responses. A few points. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/world/europe/johnson-brexit-hong-kong.html 1/12

There is nothing that the UK is doing with its China policy at the moment that it couldn’t have done as an EU member. On HK, China and other issues, the UK always worked through other groupings when it made sense to do so rather than “hiding” behind an EU position. 2/

Brexit is a real loss for both the UK and the EU when it comes to China policy (and Asia policy more generally). The EU already misses one of the only European states that had real depth of expertise, experience and reach in the region. France is the only peer. 3/

But the UK now lacks the scope to push EU China and Asia policy in certain helpful directions - and these were very much issues over which it had sway. This is already evident on HK. 4/

That is not to say HK is an issue where - at present - it’s likely to be possible to gain consensus behind a really strong EU position but I think there’s no question that with the UK out, it will be consistently weaker. That’s not helpful to UK interests. 5/

The UK approach to China is coming out in a commendable place now. But it’s the result of a) the revolt in the Conservative party; b) the fact that maintaining its previous policy without partners was untenable, as the experience with the US over Huawei showed. (a) ties to (b)

The British government tried the “independent”, “differentiated” version of its China policy and it collapsed. Now instead we have the democratic coalition-building version. This is much better. But it’s a position into which the UK has in many ways been forced. 7/

On a wide spectrum of the big issues in play vis-a-vis China policy, the EU’s involvement is critical. The major strategic economic and technology matters - from supply chains to data flows to connectivity to taking on Chinese subsidies - are not going to be solved by the 5 Eyes.

The US, Japan et al are ever-more aware of this, hence the proliferation of new dialogues. And the areas where the EU matters most are also the issues where its position is likely to be most robust, stronger even in certain areas than the US (see the new antitrust instruments) 9/

Brexit politics does result in some hang-ups on the UK side about figuring out how to align on this agenda - watch the last Commons debate about Huawei/5G for a representative sample. You could easily emerge without knowing that the actual alternatives are European companies. 10/

Ironically, many facets of the UK’s new approach to China (“Project Defend” etc.) are precisely what it used to fight against in the EU. The UK is not alone - the mindset shift from other European free-traders has been quite stark - but it is certainly not in the vanguard... 11/

I do think the UK is going to be a source of creative energy on figuring out the new democratic coalition building that will be required on China. But that was always possible. The obstacle to it was the “Golden Era” and its tortured aftermath, not the EU. 12/12