So, it seems like China has now —expectedly — begun prodding the Diphu Pass (Walong) at the Myanmar tri-junction & Tawang at the Bhutan tri-junction v. aggressively after all that it has done in Ladakh. https://twitter.com/PaliwalAvi/status/1264317258840576008

Seems like they’ve already accosted Indian soldiers & doubled the size of their patrol parties. To be fair, India too increased patrolling of these sectors & is likely to be maintaining equitable force ratios. But — this is v worrying. https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/chinese-troops-now-stepping-up-activity-near-arunachal-pradesh-120063000061_1.html

These are sectors that witnessed heavy fighting in ‘62, and are likely to test India’s mil. capabilities as much as straining its diplomatic outreach w/ Bhutan & Myanmar. Though the former might be more inclined to tilt towards N. Delhi (?), the latter is likely to shy away.

China’s investment in Myanmar is too deep & strategically critical. Though Myanmar has no claim at the tri-junction, it’s dip. support — & mil. intel. support by the KIA — will be essential for India in a prolonged standoff (testing its Act East policy)!

A long standoff at Walong will basically not just bring India’s decades-old policy of engaging w/ the Tatmadaw into question — but also it’s lack of engagement w/ Myanamr’s EAOs (many of who, eg KIO/A, have sought meaningful reln w/ India that goe beyond mil. tactical support).

During my fieldwork in Kachin State & conversations w/ serving & retired KIA/O officials (senior, mid, & junior), a common& somewhat counterintuitive point emerged: China is v sensitive about KIO’s links w/ India (& the US of course).

When asked why, the most candid response by a mid level KIA officer was: Beijing has always been worried that the Indians will bring the Tibetans & Kachins together to fight the PLA. It didn’t make much sense to me then. Now, somehow, it does.

Not that India has nursed such ambitions. But that China does view things in a peculiar way — a way many in Delhi don’t often grasp. The KIA had essentially told me: ‘Beijing doesn’t trust even us, despite all we get from China ... &, well, they’ve good reasons not to trust us.’