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Alright y’all, it’s time to talk about Hamas. [Thread]
Recently, I was slanderously called “anti-Semitic” and a “Nazi” for making the factual statement, substantiated within the scholarship, that this organization de facto supports two States, despite its toxic rhetoric.
Recently, I was slanderously called “anti-Semitic” and a “Nazi” for making the factual statement, substantiated within the scholarship, that this organization de facto supports two States, despite its toxic rhetoric.
Within this thread, I will now provide citations for that statement. In doing so, I wish to dispel the myth that the conflict would only progress if not for the “rejectionism” of Hamas. I make no statement concerning them beyond this.
In a 2007 confidential report issued [2]
In a 2007 confidential report issued [2]
by a European think tank assessing emerging issues for policy research in the Middle East, the authors refer to the “predominance of a moralising political discourse” that has “preempted discussion of Middle East policies on the basis of evidence.” In doing so, this [3]
discourse “constitutes a diversion, a political and intellectual justification for policies and practices that are informed by the need for conformity, not by the reality they are purportedly there to address” (Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza).
The report concluded [4]
The report concluded [4]
with, “Perhaps we should be trying to find out what is their [the Islamists] agenda, their priorities? It is important to remember not to juxtapose Islamists as radical in contrast to ‘moderate’ regimes in the region. This is simply misleading: in most cases, these are [5]
authoritarian regimes and in most cases Islamists will moderate on many issues ...”
Okay, so has Hamas evolved on the issue of two States? To Zionists, this is certainly in the negative: they point to the infamous Charter and the org.’s rhetoric.
This evidence is not [6]
Okay, so has Hamas evolved on the issue of two States? To Zionists, this is certainly in the negative: they point to the infamous Charter and the org.’s rhetoric.
This evidence is not [6]
convincing upon any review of the academic literature. With regards to the Charter, “from the mid-1990s onward, Hamas ‘rarely, if at all’ invoked it..., to the point that it ‘no longer cites or refers’ to it” (Norman Finkelstein, Gaza, citing: Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought [7]
and Practice; Zuhur, Hamas and Israel; Gunning, Hamas in Politics).
Of course, if we wish to talk about “Charters,” one may refer to the rejectionism of the Likud Party Platform, as academics on this topic have done before (See: https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2014/11/israel%E2%80%99s-policy-statehood-merits-same-scrutiny-hamas-gets). As a matter of [8]
Of course, if we wish to talk about “Charters,” one may refer to the rejectionism of the Likud Party Platform, as academics on this topic have done before (See: https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2014/11/israel%E2%80%99s-policy-statehood-merits-same-scrutiny-hamas-gets). As a matter of [8]
fact, recent political developments by Hamas are “closer to the two-State framework than the manifesto of Likud,” according to Tareq Baconi (See: https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/02/hamas-charter-antisemitism).
But this is not a recent development either. In a study on various electoral documents put out by [9]
But this is not a recent development either. In a study on various electoral documents put out by [9]
the organization during the Palestinian electoral cycle of 2006, some in English and others exclusively in Arabic, the academic Khaled Hroub observes, “Despite the oft-repeated rhetoric of Hamas’s leaders that their movement will remain faithful to its known principles,” the [10]
documents “reveal beyond question that the demands of the national arena have driven Hamas in dramatically new directions, confirming and going beyond profound changes that had been in the making for almost a decade,” including the status of [11]
Israel (See: https://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article/35/4/6/53413/A-New-Hamas-through-Its-New-Documents).
Quoting Sara Roy, “Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas’s Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization’s willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-State [12]
Quoting Sara Roy, “Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas’s Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization’s willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-State [12]
solution ..., a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoner’s Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-State solution, that is, a Palestinian State within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem ...”
Indeed, a 2009 study by a [13]
Indeed, a 2009 study by a [13]
U.S. government agency concluded that Hamas had “been carefully and consciously adjusting its political program for years” and had “sent repeated signals that it is ready to begin a process of coexisting with Israel.” This was, of course, known by major U.S. political [14]
figures back during the electoral cycle, including Jimmy Carter.
But the U.S. administration worked against this evolution, specifically by discouraging Palestinian factions from joining a Hamas-proposed broad coalition government as well as funding a coup (up to tens of [15]
But the U.S. administration worked against this evolution, specifically by discouraging Palestinian factions from joining a Hamas-proposed broad coalition government as well as funding a coup (up to tens of [15]
millions of dollars, explicitly designed to push Hamas from power), all due to “the U.S. [being] against any ‘blurring’ of the line dividing Hamas from those Palestinian political forces committed to the two-State solution,” according to the U.N. Special Coordinator for the [16]
Middle East Peace Process (citation: Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza).
Hell, even Israeli intelligence knew of this evolution. “The Hamas leadership has recognized that its ideological goal is not attainable and will not be in the foreseeable future,” former Mossad [17]
Hell, even Israeli intelligence knew of this evolution. “The Hamas leadership has recognized that its ideological goal is not attainable and will not be in the foreseeable future,” former Mossad [17]
head Ephraim Levy observed in 2008. Furthermore, he pointed out, the organization is ready to de facto support two States, “a path that could lead them far from their original ideological goals.”
Zionists are, in fact, aware of this. It is why they focus so much on the [18]
Zionists are, in fact, aware of this. It is why they focus so much on the [18]
refusal of Hamas to recognize Israel’s “Right to Exist,” a concept that has no basis within international law. Even then, this has also been criticized by Ephraim Levy, who has pointed out that “a priori renunciation of ideology before contact ... has never been made before [19]
either to an Arab state or to the Palestinian Liberation Organization/Fatah.” It’s simply a sleight-of-hand designed to further Israeli conquest, politicide (See: http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles/KimmerlingPoliticide.htm), and apartheid (See: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/democracy-goverance-and-service-delivery/report-israel-practicing-apartheid-in-palestinian-territories).
To conclude with a note on Hamas’s [20]
To conclude with a note on Hamas’s [20]
electoral win, quoting a Palestinian academic, “Hamas did not radicalize Palestinians but Palestinians mainstreamed Hamas.”
A note can be made on the “weaponization of anti semitism” claims, but I personally feel that I am it qualified to talk about it at length.
A note can be made on the “weaponization of anti semitism” claims, but I personally feel that I am it qualified to talk about it at length.
