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Much commentary on David Frost’s appointment as National Security Advisor is wide of the mark. Some has been more to the point. Who is David and what are the implications of his appointment? I declare an interest, having known him since the early ‘90s. Longish thread...(1/25)
David has proved himself a capable senior civil servant, with decades of experience in the FCO, the Department for Business, and as UK ambassador in Copenhagen. He also ran an industry body well, by most accounts. (2/25)
As a special advisor he has commanded the confidence of the Prime Minister, both during their time at the FCO and now, in Downing Street. He has worked well with civil servants. He has performed a vital bridging function, between politicians and senior civil servants. (3/25)
While a senior civil servant, David will have had frequent exposure to national security and intelligence issues, even though his headline roles were not in those areas. As a special advisor to Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, likewise, under different rules. (4/25)
It is legitimate to ask whether David has the depth and breadth of knowledge and experience in politico-military, counter-terrorism, intelligence etc. issues compared to previous NSAs, or heads of the Cabinet Office’s Overseas and Defence Secretariat. (5/25)
Compared to Peter Ricketts, the first NSA, who had a strong security background, no. Compared to Kim Darroch, whose senior career to that point had been heavily EU focused, perhaps. Both Peter and Kim are widely agreed to have carried out the job to a high standard. (6/25)
The key questions to ask about David are:
•can he learn, fast?
•can he lead?
•will he uphold and defend the UK constitution?
The last of these is hugely important, even if the answers to the first two are positive. Let’s take them in turn. (7/25)
•can he learn, fast?
•can he lead?
•will he uphold and defend the UK constitution?
The last of these is hugely important, even if the answers to the first two are positive. Let’s take them in turn. (7/25)
Can he learn, fast? Yes. The issue isn’t intellect. Given his status as a politically appointed special advisor, it’s political/ ideological. Will facts and well founded, expert analysis be interpreted objectively, or moulded to fit political preferences? We can’t be sure. (8/25)
Can he lead? With the personal authority of the Prime Minister, yes, in the sense of being understood to be in charge, by all participants in the national security process. (9/25)
More broadly, whether can he convince as a leader, particularly in the diverse and pressurised national security community, with his ethics and integrity, expertise and intellect, empathy and authenticity, remains an untested, open question. (10/25)
Will he uphold and defend the UK constitution? I am sure he will wish to. But it’s reasonable to ask whether he has been put in an impossible position. (11/25)
The UK system isn’t presidential. When, in the USA, the President appoints a politically partisan national security advisor, a post not requiring Senate confirmation, he does so in the context of a series of well established checks and balances. (12/25)
These do not exist, or are far less powerful, in the UK’s particular form of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. That’s why, in the UK, the political impartiality of the Civil Service plays such an important role. (13/25)
It’s possible, of course, to imagine a UK system based on a government machine packed with the Prime Minister’s political partisans, neither subject to democratic oversight nor the requirements of neutrality and objectivity. (14/25)
And it’s possible to argue that it would be a more effective way of delivering the Prime Minister’s political agenda. (15/25)
But that makes huge and, to put it at its mildest, highly questionable assumptions about the long term national interest. And the proper constitutional extent and limits of a democratic mandate in the House of Commons. (16/25)
To what extent should a Prime Minister - or even a Cabinet - be permitted to exercise largely unfettered, quasi monarchical powers between general elections? Her Majesty’s Government is not a privately held corporation. (17/25)
Without substantial changes in the UK to create a robust equivalent to US Senate and judicial oversight of the executive, or some similarly powerful system, the good intentions of a political appointee are worth little. (18/25)
If such major changes are to be made to the UK system, the process by which they happen is as important as the substance. (19/25)
A huge constitutional shift - which is what it would be - will be tainted with illegitimacy, and risk collapse, if not implemented transparently, by consensus, and with intellectual rigour. (20/25)
So far, none of these tests have been met. The blog publications, over however long a period of years by however senior and influential a politically appointed advisor to the Prime Minister, while of interest, are no substitute. (21/25)
In summary:
•we can feel confident that David Frost wishes to serve the national interest;
•we should reject some commentary which appears to belittle his earlier career; (22/25)
•we can feel confident that David Frost wishes to serve the national interest;
•we should reject some commentary which appears to belittle his earlier career; (22/25)
•we don’t yet know how well he will perform as a leader at the pinnacle of the UK national security establishment; (23/25)
•he is a political partisan, in a role which, under current UK constitutional arrangements needs strict neutrality, for good reason. It’s unclear how that fundamental tension can be overcome, however good the intentions of one individual; (24/25)
•if major constitutional changes are to happen, they need first to be rigorously interrogated, and be implemented transparently and by democratic consensus. (25/25)