slightly less than nuclear take: she is right, at least about this. in a two party system, you essentially have two options for signaling discontent with your preferred party:
1. vote for the opposition
2. withhold your vote (don't vote, or vote third party)

1/n https://twitter.com/nectarina12/status/1277479004937674753

it is not hard to see that, from the perspective of a candidate, it makes the most sense to invest in (either directly or by making promises to) voters whose loyalty is uncertain. broadly speaking, this means you can aim for the center or for the fringes. 2/n

threatening to withhold a vote is one of the few ways voters on the fringes can keep their preferred party accountable: it provides a clear incentive for leaders not only to govern effectively but also to listen to voters' concerns. 3/n

if an elected leader's seat is absolutely never threatened (because, for example, they are an incumbent D and the majority of D voters have pledged to vote blue no matter who), there is basically no incentive for them to govern well. 4/n

i haven't analyzed this rigorously, but i would predict that districts in which officials largely come from one party and are seldom opposed by viable challengers are among the worst run districts in the nation. they might be as bad as single party states. 5/n

of course, withholding your vote is a risky strategy. you have to weigh the likelihood that your party will lose and how much worse the opposing party would be. on the one hand, trump would be manifestly worse than biden by just about any reasonable measure, but... 6/n

disturbingly, withholding your vote is a STRONGER signal when the odds are close and the stakes are high. in close elections, candidates must pull out the stops to get as many votes as possible, and if the other candidate is markedly worse, the cost of losing is even higher. 7/n

this is not to say that withholding your vote is generally a good idea. however, the INCENTIVE is clearly there, and it's even stronger now that elections are increasingly won not by appealing to the center but by getting as many of your voters to the polls as possible. 8/n

all of this is a recipe for electoral "instability" (runaway political polarization) caused by "negative representation": 9/n https://twitter.com/koaleszenz/status/1219748531201691648

the way to fix this problem in the long run (removing the perverse incentive to throw one's vote away and putting a fire under the feet of elected officials in "safe" seats) is, naturally, to do away with the two party system by abolishing FPTP. 10/n

suppose there were a third party further left than the Ds (call it "L"), and suppose voters did not have to worry about "spoiling" between the two left candidates. a voter would have an option besides D or "throw vote away": vote L. 11/n

in a ranked voting system, they could list D second, content in the fact that they've still put pressure on Ds to listen to them while still voting their conscience. in a system like approval voting, they could vote "yea" on L or on both L and D. 12/n

in an election for multiple seats (especially with a proportional representation system), voting L would allow a couple of genuinely left people to hold seats: they could negotiate with Ds and earn concessions to the left in exchange for support. 13/n

and due to the lack of a spoiler effect, L voters would almost never be at risk of aiding Rs in getting elected by refusing to vote for Ds, so the incentive to withhold support for a D altogether would be lessened. 14/n

moreover, a viable third party would allow challenges to entrenched politicians in (otherwise) de facto single party districts. again, i have a hunch this would massively improve the quality of governance in these districts. 15/n

my dream is for the libs and the left to unite in favor of overthrowing FPTP (which, status quo, disproportionately benefits the right). 16/n

from the libs' point of view, this means more accountability for Ds and better governance overall. from the left's point of view, it means real representation for the left at various levels of government. 17/n

i hope to model some of these ideas explicitly at some point (if i ever get through my current backlog of projects). we'll see what happens. n/n