On GERD, a couple of points to frame the current situation, and to point out where we stand on reaching a deal, elaborating on previous threads:

- Egypt has played all its diplomatic cards. It wasted years as a non-permanent member of UNSC and a year with Sisi as president of AU

Ethiopia is a country divided along many lines. A tinderbox that could explode at any minute. The staunch nationalism around the dam project means GERD is almost the only thing that binds the country together at this time.

As I have said countless times: the facts on the ground leave Egypt at the mercy of Ethiopia based on geography/location. A self-funded GERD leaves little internships mandate or laws. There is no water-management agreeement on the Nile. NBI/NWA 1959 incomplete/effectively moot.

There are only two things that could - imho - prevent Ethiopia from filling this year: a delay to completing construction (although the dam can technically still fill phase 1 without being 100% complete), and if a far away threat of sanctions is exercised/becomes more real.

Egypt is left insecure by a non-binding full agreement with no permemnant water management deal or binding arbitration, or extremely insecure by no agreement at all. Both desperate positions and indeed, very unfair.

The return to colonial sentiment re: River Nile is interesting but dangerous. Egypt abandoned commitment to NWA 1959 after Khartoum was signed. Ethiopia resurrecting it confirms desires to continue more development on the river - if unilateral would destroy Egypt’s water access.

But again: there is no tripartite or international desire for a “water war”. And here, Sudan is key. A fragile transition but the country most likely to both benefit from GERD and/or be heavily negatively affected dependent on how the situation pans out-unrelated to actual fill.

That’s reason enough to be positive something will be scrambled together, although unlikely to be anything near what Egypt desires or hopes, anymore. The days of an equitable agreement that all sides can sell as political success appear to be long gone. It’s now about mitigation.

But caution: AU mediation has been offered before and rejected. It has taken this long to find the most (allegedly) “middle-ground” mediation partner, and that doesn’t bode well. Also signals UNSC would rather not get involved, which weakens Egypt’s bargaining power.

Hence my conclusion that materially little has changed on the ground in last 9 months. In political terms on the Nile, little has changed in years. But Sudan’s transition & Ethiopia’s domestic situation have changed dynamics, both positively and negatively respectively. END.

I’ll just add that I, like everyone else, desperately want to see an agreement reached and in a way that mitigates damage to Egypt’s water access. But that comes with accepting new power-sharing over the river and new dynamics, including less water than previously relied upon.

adding important addendum from previous thread: Ethiopia has most-certainly been obstructionist and has delayed material movement of negotiations since 2015, using granular disagreement over terms & agreement on technical studies and conclusions to stall any development of talks.