The @CoalitionSahel presents structural criticalities and they can bring to a substantial fiasco of this effort.
1. A first issue is a step back on ownership. #CoalitionSahel is a French decision, a reaction to critics in the regions. Its Secretariat is in Paris. 1/5
1. A first issue is a step back on ownership. #CoalitionSahel is a French decision, a reaction to critics in the regions. Its Secretariat is in Paris. 1/5
2. #CoalitionSahel is officially structured in 4 pillars but we can see from the ongoing declarations that full attention is dedicated to military efforts.
Yet #militarization is a further threat for the #Sahel as I discuss here:
https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/out-security-deadlock-challenges-and-choices-sahel">https://www.iai.it/en/pubbli... @IAIonline 2/5
Yet #militarization is a further threat for the #Sahel as I discuss here:
https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/out-security-deadlock-challenges-and-choices-sahel">https://www.iai.it/en/pubbli... @IAIonline 2/5
3. The #CoalitionSahel could contribute to coordination, but "more coordination won’t fix the Sahel" as argued by @tweetsintheME https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_more_coordination_wont_fix_the_sahel
What">https://www.ecfr.eu/article/c... is missing is a clear political strategy 3/5
What">https://www.ecfr.eu/article/c... is missing is a clear political strategy 3/5
4. Furthermore, the "new" non-military initiatives labelled as #CoalitionSahel seem a patchwork of already ongoing or planned programmes by the #EU, #WB, EU member states, etc.
@ecowas_cedeao and other minor regional org. still have a marginal role. 4/5
@ecowas_cedeao and other minor regional org. still have a marginal role. 4/5
5. Finally, the role on civil society organizations appears very limited or missing, while a #CSOs coalition coud help: #coalition">https://www.coalition-sahel.org/coalition-pour-le-sahel/ #coalition">https://www.coalition-sahel.org/coalition... END