Spurs 1-1 Man Utd - a tactical analysis thread:

•Mourinho had selected an attacking line-up in terms of personnel with 4 out-and-out attackers in an asymmetrical 4-2-3-1
- Kane led the line, was flanked by Son who stretched the pitch very wide left & Bergwijn was played more tucked in from the right & Lamela as a 10

•Although Mourinho's selections were attacking,his overall approach had more pragmatism- with the 4-2-3-1 morphing into a rigid 4-4-2 off-the-ball
-whilst Lamela+Kane defended from the front as a duo, they did not engage in a press until one of Man Utd’s CBs carried it forwards

- Spurs then had a bank of 4 behind with Son & Bergwijn instructed to track Shaw & Wan Bissaka all the way back - perhaps an excessively conservative strategy given they aren’t the most productive full-backs (2 PL assists between them this season)

- Spurs' defensive line was deep from the start of the game with Mourinho very wary of Rashford & Martial's counter-attacking threat. Man Utd have the highest % of counter-attacking goals in the Premier League - 19%

Mourinho's post-match quotes clearly demonstrated this:

- the final Mourinho adaptation was to ensure that when Spurs attacked, Davies was instructed to stay in a deeper position to essentially form a back 3 with Davinson & Dier provided the freedom for Aurier to fly forwards & overlap the aforementioned narrowly-positioned Bergwijn

•Inverted wingers are a norm,but Bergwijn showed value of playing a winger on the side of his strong foot- Maguire shows Bergwijn onto weaker left,but as detailed in our January Bergwijn thread,he has a trademark move of dribbling inside then cutting back onto his right to shoot

•The other problem posed to United with this tactic was tracking Bergwijn's excellently timed in-to-out runs- Aurier's overlaps were occupying Shaw,so it dragged Maguire into uncomfortable wide 1v1 scenarios
-Maguire & Lindelof actually had to swap sides from 39 minutes until HT

•The key in the first half was that unlike the 2nd half when the whole side (including the forwards) retreated too deep,Spurs still had attacking players in advanced enough positions to launch out of the defensive block into counter-attacks, after luring Man Utd players forwards

•Another key in the 1st half for Mourinho was the use of Lamela - he acted as a conduit between Spurs' midfield winning the ball & their attack- positioned himself around the halfway line, then span away from his marker. It was very similar to how KDB played vs Arsenal on Wed

•As we mentioned in our Bergwijn to Spurs thread in January- providing a link for the counter-attack is also one of Bergwijn's classic traits and he did so again on a few occasions. You can see why Mourinho wanted to sign him to fit his style of football

•Man Utd also set up with a 4-2-3-1 but their main issue in the first half was that both wide players (Rashford & James) were too uninvolved in the play. They were positioned too wide and rarely made runs out-to-in runs or found space in between the lines

- despite Man Utd having 64% possession, Rashford & James had 46 touches in the first half compared to Son & Bergwijn who had 58 touches

•However, this changed drastically in the 2nd half
a) Rashford constantly attempted out-to-in runs. This led to him touching the ball 8 times in the box.
b) Greenwood (subbed on at 74 mins) as a left-footer was much more keen than James to find space in between the lines

•Pogba sub was also a key part of Man Utd's 2nd half resurgence. 3 methods in which Pogba helps break down low blocks:
1. Man Utd attack now knew they had someone that could find them in between the lines, e.g. Pogba found Bruno 5 times - his most frequent passing combination

2. His 1v1 dribbling where he won beat Eric Dier like a tricky winger and not a central midfielder
3. And his long-range passing - a 70 yard pass to Rashford supplied one of his out-to-in runs we mentioned previously

•This additional threat & control in possession (18/19 passes completed by Pogba) was facilitated by Spurs' out-of-possession 4-4-2 shape retreating much too deep
- e.g. the chance for Martial which was saved by Lloris, where all 11 Spurs players are inside their own third!!!

-allows Maguire to carry ball too farPogba & Bruno pick up advanced dangerous positions instead of needing to build playoccupies Spurs' midfieldersforwards (Rashford then Martial for chance) find space between Spurs' back 4 sagging towards goal & the occupied Spurs midfield

•Winks the only Spurs player who could impress in the 2nd half acting as a 'pressure reliever' with his ability to nick the ball off opponents' toes then playing simple but effective forward pressure-relieving passes
-in the 2nd half,he made 4 ball recoveries & 16 forward passes

•However,Spurs suddenly transformed this very deep defensive block into a more progressive shape as soon as Man Utd scored
-evidence that it was a conscious choice from Mou to sit so deep

- with...
a) Davies & Davinson (both have sufficient pace) flanking Dier
b)Spurs having the energy to maintain this mid-press from 81-90 minutes

Was there a need to sit even deeper than the first half, prior to the equaliser?

Mourinho perhaps should have found a better balance

Summary

•Mou rigid 4-4-2 shape out-of-possession can work well defensively but he must ensure it's not dragged too deep
•Potential with Bergwijn in narrow right wing role with Aurier overlapping & Davies staying deep in back 3
•Pogba-Bruno
•Rashford out-to-in runs are key