Official *PROPOSAL* (not yet policy) from the KMT on a potential new cross-Strait approach: http://www.kmt.org.tw/2020/06/blog-post_19.html (Chinese)

Takeaways on the "1992 Consensus":
- The KMT blames both the DPP & the CCP for contributing to public misunderstanding of the "1992 Consensus."

1/17

- On the latter point, they reference Xi Jinping's 2019 New Years address and his emphasis on "One Country, Two Systems" as contributing to these misunderstandings.
- The KMT emphasizes sovereignty of the ROC and, with it, a rejection of "One Country, Two Systems"

2/17

- They really dig their heels in on this point, stress that the ROC Constitution has served as the legal basis for cross-Strait dialogue, and that their view of "One China, respective interpretations" is grounded in the ROC Constitution.

3/17

This line might be the most critical: 中共當局如果希望兩岸關係和平發展建立在「九二共識」基礎上，自應尊重中華民國是一個主權國家的事實。沒有中華民國，就沒有「九二共識」。唯有本於中華民國憲法的兩岸共識，才能重新開啟兩岸官方對官方協商。

4/17

「一國兩制」會改變中華民國主權國家地位，台灣人民不會接受，在中華民國憲法之下，沒有一國兩制的空間。

I'm going to try my best at translating it (my Chinese could be better) :

5/17

"If Chinese authorities hope for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations based upon the '1992 Consensus,' they should respect the reality that the ROC is a sovereign country. Without the ROC, there would be no '1992 Consensus'."

6/17

"Only with a cross-Strait consensus based off of the ROC Constitution, can official cross-Strait negotiations resume. 'One Country, Two Systems' would change the sovereign status of the ROC and the people of Taiwan will not accept it."

7/17

"Under the ROC Constitution, there is no room for 'One Country, Two Systems."

8/17

So what does this mean? A few initial thoughts and points of confusion:

I'm not sure how they plan to square "One China, respective interpretations" with "cross-Strait consensus based off the ROC Constitution." I need to check official Chinese-language from before--

9/17

But had thought that "respective interpretations" meant that the KMT could hold that "China" is the ROC, the CCP the PRC, and they could agree to disagree*. This seems to imply otherwise. Does this mean a formal acknowledgement from the CCP of the existence of the ROC?

10/17

*Shameless plug, the CCP has been careful to never mention "respective interpretations"--which gives it room to maneuver and plausible deniability. I wrote about that here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/11/taiwan-opposition-kuomintang-kmt-pro-china-1992-consensus/

11/17

So, the KMT is seemingly seeking greater clarity on "One China, respective interpretations" while the CCP has signaled that the "true" "1992 Consensus" is one without "respective interpretations" (I explain this in depth in my article)

12/17

Further, China has more or less linked the "1992 Consensus" with "One Country, Two Systems" and the KMT is, predictably, explicitly rejecting it.

The two parties may be moving their markers increasingly further away from one another.

13/17

Does this suggest the death knell of the "1992 Consensus" (if passed)?

I'm not sure--they were able to work past existing contradictions for eight years. But this does make it more difficult to find a common baseline and may depend largely on political will.

14/17

There's also an important point on how the KMT's policy may be moving closer in line with the DPP's--and there are many noteworthy parallels here.

Both KMT & DPP reject "One Country, Two Systems."

Both (may be) saying "we'll talk when you recognize ROC sovereignty."

15/17

(Second point above based off my assessment, is not explicit in the text)

So that's my 1 am hot take. Happy to discuss (and be corrected if I'm wrong!)

16/17

Again, worth stressing, RIGHT NOW THIS IS ONLY A PROPOSAL and is not yet party policy. It's currently with the reform committee and will need to be voted on to be formally adopted by the party.

17/17