I read the Venezuela chapter of John Bolton’s book, which covers the first few months of 2019, from the January declaration of Juan Guaidó as acting president, to the failed April 30 coup/uprising. Some highlights (thread):

Trump’s attitude toward Venezuela policy vacillates between eagerness for a full on military invasion (opposed by his advisors) and open admiration for Maduro and disdain for Guaidó.

Trump had proposed an invasion of Venezuela in a speech in Aug. 2017. He also proposed meeting with Maduro in person. Bolton and Pompeo advised him against both.

Throughout debates over US-Ven policy, Trump doubted Maduro would be overthrown, saying he’s “too smart and too tough.” After Guaidó’s swearing in ceremony, Trump said “I’ve always said Maduro is tough. This kid - nobody’s ever heard of him.”

On Guaidó, Trump said “he doesn’t have what it takes,” and called him “the Beto O’Rourke of Venezuela.”

One of Trump’s comments about Guaidó being weak came after meeting his wife, Fabiana Rosales. Per Bolton: “The most unexpected outcome of the meeting was Trump’s perception that Rosales had not worn a wedding ring and how young she looked.”

In a May 23 call with Trump, Putin compared Guaidó to Hillary Clinton, as someone who proclaimed himself pres without any real support. Putin told him that US support for Guaidó had consolidated support for Maduro. This largely persuaded Trump to lay off on more Ven. sanctions.

After being convinced to recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president, Trump said (Bolton: “unhelpfully”) “I want him to say he will be extremely loyal to the United States and no one else.”

Trump was largely convinced by Rubio to take an aggressive Venezuela policy. Rubio pushed for regime change, saying “this may be the last chance” and “a big foreign policy win.”

However Trump wanted a military option, and raised this with a Florida Congressional delegation, who were all “stunned” except for Rubio, who “knew how to deflect it politely.”

Bolton, Shanahan and Dunford were against an invasion, but discussed it “solely to keep Trump interested in the objective of overthrowing Maduro.”

Bolton says the yellow pad incident was Trump’s idea of a prank. Claims Trump asked him if we should send 5k troops to Colombia if they were needed, and told Bolton “go have fun with the press.” Bolton wrote this down, flashed it to the press, and it got photographed.

As for Bolton, he pushed for, and got, sweeping sanctions on Venezuela which he believed would result in a successful uprising.
“We played no role in encouraging or assisting the Opposition” in declaring Guaidó prez, but “I had no doubt what we should do. The revolution was on.”

Nevertheless the chapter details intimate coordination between the Trump admin and Ven. Opposition. Worked with the Lima group to recognize Guaidó, which “took little or no convincing.”

The opposition’s Cucutá humanitarian aid confrontation, intended in part to force Maduro into a bad photo op, was coordinated with help of Pentagon and USAID. But leaders of Colombia, Panama, Chile, Paraguay, OAS were on the ground to give it no “made in Washington” veneer.

After Russian statements of support for Maduro, Trump got cold feet about supporting a military uprising, saying “the entire army is behind him.” Later, Trump was struck by “All those good looking generals” who declared support for Maduro.

One consistent thread throughout the chapter is Bolton’s hatred for Treasury Sec. Mnuchin, whom he blames for undermining his Venezuela sanctions policy.

Another is Bolton’s belief that Cuba is the puppet master behind everything in Venezuela, and Ven. policy should be part of broader policy toward Cuba and Nicaragua. He brags Trump complimented him on the phrase “troika of tyranny,” though Trump’s speechwriter came up with it.

So when convening a Sit. room meeting on Venezuela sanctions, Bolton proposed “why not go after all three at once?” Everyone agreed except Mnuchin, who worried about impact on US oil investments and a global rise in oil prices.

Bolton also met with US Citgo execs to pledge support for them to keep control of US refineries and gas stations, and shield them from the Maduro government by supporting the nomination of Guaidó loyalists to the board of directors.

In another dig at Mnuchin, Bolton describes how after Mnuchin expressed doubts about sanctions, Energy Sec. Rick Perry “politely explained to him how oil and gas markets actually worked internationally.”

In addition to oil companies, Mnuchin worried how sanctions would affect Visa and MasterCard. Bolton:
“Really, there was a revolution going on, and Mnuchin was worried about credit cards!”

Bolton also believed the State Dept’s Western Hemisphere Bureau was “in open revolt against sanctions,” more concerned with getting assurances for the safety of embassy personnel than putting the screws on Maduro.

Bolton believes Pompeo’s decision to close US Embassy Caracas, “to avoid another Benghazi,” was a mistake, as was not embedding US advisors in the opposition, because it limited US influence.

The other running theme in the book is self flattery. Guaido’s wife Fabiana Rosales told him, “Mr. Bolton, it is an honor to count on you as we do” and “the regime wonders if the US military threat is credible, but they are most afraid when John Bolton starts tweeting!”

When Bolton wrote a letter excoriating Mnuchin, his buddy Elliot Abrams praised it as “a classic. It should be studied in schools of government!”

When Russia’s UN delegation condemned Bolton for “Bolshevik style” expropriation of Ven. oil assets, he describes it as “an honor!”

He also describes the drone attack on Maduro in 2018, a failed assassination attempt involving explosives, as “hilarious.”

As for the failure of the April 30 coup, and broader failure of his policies to accomplish regime change, Bolton is in denial. He blames Mnuchin, the State Department, Cuba, and Russia.

Despite the military failing to rise up against Maduro after Guaidó’s call, Bolton is convinced they don’t feel any loyalty to the regime. “The military is still perfectly capable of ousting the regime, not just Maduro, and allowing a return to democracy.”

Of course what we know now is that even if regime change is the goal of US Ven policy, Bolton’s policies were completely counterproductive.

To be effective, sanctions require coordination with other countries, which requires diplomacy. Trump and Bolton were entirely unwilling to do that work, allowing Russia and China to give Maduro avenues to evade them. https://twitter.com/mpaarlberg/status/1244999865102471169?s=21 https://twitter.com/mpaarlberg/status/1244999865102471169

Thus the corrupt officials whom sanctions target are insulated, while ordinary Venezuelans suffer. The sanctions give the Maduro government an easy scapegoat to blame for their own economic mismanagement.

And the administration’s overt support for regime change, including half baked plots predicated on unproven claims by Bolton that “80% of the military” is behind Guaidó and the military will soon “fragment,” bolster Maduro’s claims that every failure is due to CIA golpistas.

Maduro’s failings are transparently obvious. He would time announcements of new coup plots to coincide with announcements of new currency devaluations. This would be laughable if not for the real and quixotic plots of people like Bolton.

FWIW I think regime change should never be a US foreign policy goal, broad sanctions hurt poor people more than the leaders they target, there should be no military option, plotting coups with corrupt generals is wrong, and also that Maduro has been a disastrous leader for Ven.